The Cresset (Vol. XLVI, No. 9) by Valparaiso University
Valparaiso University 
ValpoScholar 
The Cresset (archived issues) 
10-1983 
The Cresset (Vol. XLVI, No. 9) 
Valparaiso University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/cresset_archive 
 Part of the Arts and Humanities Commons, and the Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public 
Administration Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Valparaiso University, "The Cresset (Vol. XLVI, No. 9)" (1983). The Cresset (archived issues). 6. 
https://scholar.valpo.edu/cresset_archive/6 
This Full Issue is brought to you for free and open access by ValpoScholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in 
The Cresset (archived issues) by an authorized administrator of ValpoScholar. For more information, please 
contact a ValpoScholar staff member at scholar@valpo.edu. 
• Robert Benne on Capitalism and the Moral Order 
• The March on Washington: The Polarizing of America? 
• Why Film Studies Doesn't Get Taken Seriously 
THE CRESSEY Valparaiso University Valparaiso, Indiana 46383 
ROBERT V. CH BEL Publisher 
JAME UECHTERLEI , Editor OCTOBER, 1983 ol. LVI, o. 
Contributors 
3 The Editor I I LUCE T A 
5 Robert Benne I CAPIT USM A D THE MOR L ORDER 
11 Lois Reiner I EMMY ( Verse) 
12 Jeff Smith I TAKI G MOVIES SERIO LY 
18 Keith Paulson-Thorp I COMP TERS A D THE F TURE OF M SIC ED CATIO 
22 Richard Lee I THE REFORMATIO PERSO ALITY 
23 James Combs I WOMEN I THE EWS 
25 Alan Graebner I WOME WHO SHOULD 'T EXIST 
27 John Steven Paul I WHEN THE THEATRE ROCKED THE CRADLE 
31 Dot Nuechterlein I A NAME IS A NAME IS AN IDENTITY 
Departmental Editors 
Jill Baumgaertner, Poetry Editor 
Richard H. W. Brauer, Art Editor 
Dorothy Czamanske, Copy Editor 
Business Managers 
Wilbur H. Hutchins, Finance 
Betty Wagner, Administration and Circulation 
0011-11 8 
THE CRESSET is published monthly during the aca-
demic year, September through May, by the Valparaiso 
University Press as a forum for ideas and informed 
opinion. The views expressed are those of the writers 
and do not necessarily reflect the preponderance of 
opinion at Valparaiso University. Manuscripts should 
be addressed to the Editor and accompanied by return 
postage. Letters to the Editor for publication are sub-
ject to editing for brevity. The Book Review Index and 
the American Humanities Index list Cresset reviews. 
Second class postage paid at Valparaiso, Indiana. Regu-
lar subscription rates: one year-$7.50; two years -
$13.00; single copy- $1.00. Student subscription rates: 
one year-$3.50; single copy- $.60. Entire contents 
copyrighted 1983 by the Valparaiso University Press, 
Valparaiso, Indiana 46383, without whose written per-
mission reproduction in whole or in part for any purpose 
whatsoever is expressly forbidden. 
Diane Vatne, La Bocca Della Verita, 1981, foyer of Sta. Maria 
in Cosmedin, Rome, Italy. B&w photograph, 11-3/4" x 7-3/4". 
2 
Cover: Diane Vatne Peeling Shadow 19 0, Bloomington, I . 
B&w photograph, 11-3/4' x 7-3/4 '. 
An exhibition of Diane atne' photograph ha been ched-
uled for alparai o ni er ity Mueller Hall Gallery Oct. 23-
ov. 16. RHWB 
The Cresset 
IN LUCE TUA 
Comment on Contemporary Affairs by the Editor 
America the Polarized? 
Those of us who participated in the original March 
on Wa hington in August, 1963 will forever remember 
it as one of the great public moments of our lives. We 
were part of a grand historic occasion, privileged both 
to witness an unsurpassed rhetorical performance-
Martin Luther King's "I have a dream" speech- and to 
be included in a mass political protest whose moral 
rectitude we would never have reason, even for a min-
ute, to doubt. There was no uncertainty, no ambiguity: 
we marched in the ranks of human decency, and no one 
with a good political conscience could march against us. 
Not often does politics offer opportunities of such 
unsullied good faith. 
The new March on Washington of this past August 27 
was an exercise in nostalgia, an attempt to relive and 
rekindle the moral fervor and political momentum of 
the original event. But in politics as in life, you can't 
go home again. This year's march was of an entirely 
different, and lesser, order than that of twenty years 
ago. The crowds were there, and the oratory strained to 
meet the occasion (the strain showed: Jesse Jackson's 
"from the outhouse to the White House" fell consider-
ably short of King's magnificent cadences), but we doubt 
that anyone seriously supposes that the second March 
on Washington will carry anything like the historical 
resonance of the first. 
It lacked, to begin with, moral focus and clarity. When 
King marched, the issue was simple: fundamental hu-
man and social rights for black Americans. To oppose 
them was to oppose what America was all about. The 
marchers carried with them the promise of American 
life, and, deep down, almost all Americans understood 
that-which is why Congress wrote into law in the 1964 
and 1965 Civil Rights Acts those things that the march-
ers insisted on. 
This time around, Congress could only meet the 
marchers' demands by arranging to vote in the millen-
nium or, at the very least, by decreeing that life be no 
longer difficult. A protest o tensibly committed to job , 
peace, and freedom contained within it ranks element 
of every cause imaginable. They wer all there: from 
the mainstream ( civil right , nuclear freeze, economic 
ju tice) to beyond the fringe ( ikh for peace, boycott 
Campbell's oup, outhern dyke for human right ). 
number of communi t and communi t-front group 
added to the march' breadth of ran if not to it politi-
cal legitimacy. 
Like in ton Churchill puddin thi mar h had 
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no theme. Even on the issue of civil rights, it could not 
command the moral urgency of its predecessor. The 
world is not necessarily a more complicated place than 
it was twenty years ago, but the civil rights issue cer-
tainly is. On matters of affirmative action (employment 
and educational quotas) and compulsory busing, there 
is not at all the kind of self-evident moral consensus that 
could be presupposed in 1963 with regard to political 
rights and guarantee of equal access to public goods and 
facilities. The moral lines were less clearly drawn this 
past August than two decades ago, and no matter how 
often or how desperately speakers invoked Martin 
Luther King's presence, the occasion had nothing of 
the moral grandeur of the original. 
And beyond the issue of civil rights, moral ambiguity 
drifted into moral anarchy. Organizers of the march, 
exhibiting the protest culture's customary absence of 
humility, christened their movement the New Coalition 
of Conscience. If so, the conscience in question appear 
notably expansive and latitudinarian. In embracing all 
causes all at once, the march necessarily sacrificed co-
herence and precision. Save the world, save the whales: 
everything dissolved into everything el e with little 
sense of priority or ethical discrimination. One couldn't 
help recalling Rome's traditional rebuke to Protestant 
enthusiasts that in following the dictates of con cience, 
we must first ensure that our conscience are rightly 
informed. 
Yet it would be misleading to focu too narrowly on 
the march's lack of a moral center. The mar her w r 
in fact united, but the ground of their unity wa p liti al 
rather than moral. The glue that held v rythin I 
together was, as one peak r expre d it, a mmitm nt 
to "rid the world of Reagani m." It wa in opp iti n t 
the President and to the p lici a o iat d with hi · 
Admini tration that th di parat gr u 
on to march in uni on. Ronald R a an ha b m 
Beyond Reagan as symbol, it is difficult to define precisely the nature of the ideological 
gulf that divides those who marched and those who would have nothing to do with the march. 
even detest, on ideological grounds. 
Beyond Reagan a ymbol, it i difficult to define 
precisely the nature of the ideological gulf that divide 
those who marched and those who would have nothing 
to do with the march. Some de cribe it simply in socio-
conomic terms as a contrast between haves and have 
nots, between those whom the system treats well and 
those whom it treats badly. Gloria Steinem, the feminist 
leader, apparently had something like this in mind when 
she remarked that the only people not represented in 
the march were wealthy middle-aged white males. (For 
her, this meant the almost certain defeat of President 
Reagan in 1984.) 
But it was not only the poor and disadvantaged who 
took part in the march. Steinem herself is part of a 
group that, while it might have serious grievances 
against the system, is not located anywhere near the 
bottom of America's socio-economic ladder. Feminism 
is a largely middle-class phenomenon. So is the gay 
rights movement. So also is the anti-nuclear cause that 
played so prominent a role in the march. Contemporary 
American political divisions cannot be understood 
simply in terms of class. 
A satisfactory explanation of our ideological divisions 
must take into account all those issues beyond economics 
that do not fall neatly into class categories. We might 
say that our most critical distinction lies between those 
who can basically affirm current American values, sys-
tems, and practices and those who cannot. Such a dis-
tinction makes room for economic grievances and satis-
factions but does not confine itself to them. It allows 
room as well for consideration of issues involving social 
policy, foreign affairs, and cultural style. Those who 
fervently oppose Reagan and who found themselves in 
sympathy with the march are those who feel alienated 
in some fundamental way from American reality; those 
who support Reagan (or oppose him without emotional 
fervor) and who see no reason to march are those who 
feel essentially comfortable with that reality. Many 
Americans, to be sure, would resist making so stark a 
choice, but events like the march indicate that it is in 
such a polarized direction that our politics is heading. 
Behind many of our specific disagreements over policy 
choices lie entirely conflicting perceptions of what 
America is and what it ought to be. 
We have seen all this before. In the late Sixties and 
early Seventies disagreements over race relation and 
Vietnam threatened to tear the country apart. People 
on oppo ite sides of issues came to doubt their oppo-
nents' patriotism and morality. Soon they were fighting 
over rightful appropriation of national symbols: re-
member when you could read people' politic by ob-
serving whether or not they tuck flag decals in their 
car window ? It wa an ugly and divisive time during 
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which merican on oppo in id f th ultural di-
vide becam , in Rain r . Baum phr " thi al 
tranger ' to on anoth r. 
We are not yet back to uch an impa but omin u 
igns abound. hat w ar one a ain in dan r of 
lo ing i the ability to agr to di agr e. That b com 
difficult when political difference r gularly get tran -
lated into moral categorie . Thu many of tho who 
participated in the Wa hington march would rej ct the 
analysis offered here that di tinguishe b tween politi-
cal and moral elements in their prote t. For them oppo-
sition to Ronald Reagan i les a political opportunity 
"than a moral imperative. When large numbers of peo-
ple start thinking that way, political civility cannot long 
be maintained. Many of our intellectuals and religious 
leaders have already lined up at the political barricades, 
and the rest of us may not be far behind. 
The critical question is whether the moralistic mood 
will come to dominate political practice. In 1972, the 
Democratic party in a spasm of reform set up a system 
of campaign and convention rules whose result was the 
nomination of George McGovern, a man who wanted 
less to govern the country than to save its soul. 
McGovern's nomination, achieved at a convention that 
had earnestly rid itself of the influence of professional 
politicians, marked the high tide of the politics of con-
science; his crushing loss to Richard Nixon brought the 
Democrats back to reality. The lesson of McGovernism 
has not been forgotten. One can't help noticing that the 
nomination of a new McGovern (perhaps Alan Crans-
ton, or even, now that he has entered the race, 
McGovern himself) is the prospect Republican politi-
cians most hope for and Democratic politicians most 
dread. Gloria Steinem is wrong: President Reagan will 
be a formidable opponent for any Democrat, especially 
one situated on the Left. And realistic Democrats under-
stand that. 
Yet even if the politicians, operating out of traditional 
instincts of self-preservation, manage in the short run 
to paper over the cultural fissures in our society, we will 
find it difficult to resist indefinitely the pressures to-
ward polarization. The influence of the adversary cul-
ture continues to grow. It already pervades the main-
stream church bureaucracies, the universities, and the 
elite media outlets. The people there, gripped in an-
tinomian enthu iasms, view with dismay and even con-
t mpt an America dominated in their eyes by racism, 
xi m militarism, and indifference to the fate of the 
poor. The distance between the dissenters and Middle 
merica is vast. half-century ago John Do Pa o 
d dared with radical bravado, "all right we are two 
nation . 'H wa wrong th n but today ... well toda 
who i to ay? ... •• 
The Cresset 
Capitalism and the Moral Order 
This essay is in the nature of an elaboration on one of 
the themes of my book, The Ethic of Democratic Capitalism: 
A Moral Reassessment (Fortress, 1981). In the last chapter 
of the book, I argue that one of the most important chal-
lenges facing our social system concerns the "cultural 
sphere," which I define as "the realm of symbolic mean-
ings which give order, coherence, and moral direction 
to the whole society." Following Daniel Bell and, before 
him, Joseph Schumpeter, I raise the perplexing ques-
tion whether capitalism will be destroyed by its successes 
rather than its failures. Both thinkers suggest that the 
culture produced by the successful workings of the mar-
ket economy undercuts the values needed for economic, 
political, and social vitality. Successful capitalism, in a 
context of liberty, markets a short-sighted, chaotic, and 
selfish hedonism. 
As I put the question: Can a people survive the com-
bination of widespread affluence and freedom? Will 
their value system erode and finally collapse, neces-
sitating an authoritarian solution that will neither toler-
ate freedom nor produce affluence? I end that chapter 
in a properly ambivalent manner, recognizing the dan-
ger we face but affirming a resilient health in the Amer-
ican moral-social order that will resist the centrifugal 
forces of hedonist culture. That moral health is based 
finally on the strength of a religious appropriation of 
reality, and I conclude that we may be experiencing a 
genuine religious renewal in this land. At least we have 
a fighting chance for such a renewal, given the strength 
and variety of our religious institutions. 
That concluding chapter, however, was rather sketchy 
and unresolved, so I welcome the opportunity to engage 
in more thorough and systematic reflection on this 
subject, so that my conclusions can be more thoroughly 
and systematically unresolved. 
When I engage persons in discussion about this ero-
sion of the moral-social order, I get two sets of responses 
Robert Benne is the Jordan-Trexler Professor of Religi,on 
at Roanoke College and Director of the College's Center for 
Church and Society. He earlier served for seventeen years as 
Professor of Church and Society al the Lutheran School of 
Theology at Chicago. This essay orig-£nated as a public lecture 
delivered at Gustavus Adolphus College in December, 1982. 
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The Limits of Commercial Republicanism 
Robert Benne 
that might serve as a useful context for further reflec-
tion. One set I call the "not to worry" response, which 
catches the smugness of that proper English expression. 
The other set is the "I told you so" response, which 
relishes the connection of corrupt motivation with cap-
italist economic arrangements. I will analyze and quar-
rel with these two sets of responses, and then report on 
my own struggle to relate the market economy to the 
moral-social order. 
"Not to Worry" 
Persons in this camp either deny that there is any real 
threat to the moral-social order, or, more likely, they 
see no real connection between that order and the eco-
nomic order. In either case, they see no serious moral 
element impinging on economic life. At most, they say, 
the cultural sphere can predispose people toward 
healthy or unhealthy economic attitudes. Religious and 
moral traditions may inhibit viable economic life, as in 
the distrustful clannishness reported in Edward Ban-
field's analysis of the moral basis of backward societie , 
or it may facilitate economic life, as in the Protestant 
Ethic's orientation toward inner-worldly a ceti i m. 
But these are really not in the realm of morality, but 
are rather in that of desired or undesired non-moral 





v riti f 
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In the resplendent utilitarianism of the commercial republicans, politics and economics came 
to care for the body, and the soul-devoted to virtue and perfection-slipped out of sight. 
the prudent and proper ways to fulfill their necessities 
and strive for their wants. (This is not reason with a 
capital "R"; it is much more modest than that.) 
This view of human being, assumed in most micro-
economic texts, does not depend much on morality. 
Even when it seems to, on closer look it involves a pru-
dential morality, one that relies on fear of the loss of 
one's interest as a discipline for right action. This is 
neatly illustrated in a very attractive essay by Alfred 
Kahn on "The Place of Ethical Values in a Market Sys-
tem" (National Economic Research Associates, Inc. , 
January 1981). Exhorting all of us to more restraint in 
our economic life, Kahn concludes: "Even pure self-
interest has plenty of room in it for compromise and 
moderation, for considering that if I do this to all the 
rest of you, you will in time do the same to me, and we 
will all end up frustrated. " 
One should not easily dismiss such a position, for it 
anchors economic life in something very solid indeed; 
it does not try to base it on the fragile flower of morality. 
What's more, a whole paradigm of civilization can be 
constructed on this firm bedrock, one that has much to 
say for it and that bears an uncanny resemblance to 
our own. 
Recently, two very interesting attempts have been 
made to uncover the intellectual and historical roots of 
such a paradigm. Ralph Lerner, in an essay called 
"Commerce and Character: The Anglo-American as 
New-Model Man" (Liberation South, Liberation North 
[Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1981]), calls 
this paradigm "commercial republicanism." Drawing 
from intellectual resources as diverse as Montesquieu 
and John Adams, Adam Smith and Benjamin Franklin, 
David Hume and Benjamin Rush, the proponents of 
the new order were united in this: "they saw in commer-
cial republicanism a more sensible and realizable alter-
native to earlier notions of civic virtue and a more just 
alternative to the theological-political regime that had 
so long ruled Europe and its colonial periphery." 
Rather than base the new civilization on the vainglor-
ious imagination and pretension of aristocratic and re-
ligious tradition, which constantly led to fanaticism, 
intolerance, and economic stagnation or disaster, the 
commercial republicans proceeded from the ordinary 
passions of ordinary men. 
Indeed , where the ancient polity , Christianity , and the feudal aris-
tocracy, each in its own fashion , sought to conceal, deny , or thwart 
most of the common passion for private gratification and physical 
comfort. the commercial republic built on those passions. 
And the mechanism for satisfying and harnessing 
those passions was the market. While the market was 
certainly not the instrument for realizing the grand 
dreams of priests and kings, it was the perfect vehicle 
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for realizing the mild ambition f middling m n . T h 
ethos created by uch an ar ran m nt led t a mod rat 
and pragmatic polity, which wid ned th chan of 
freedom and pro perity fo r m ore p opl . To qu v ill 
put it well: "Violent political pa ion hav little hold 
on men whose whole thoughts ar b nt on the pur uit 
of well-being. Their excitement about mall matter 
makes them calm about great one ." What a marvelous 
way to place both economics and politics beneath moral-
ity, and in so doing build the bourgeois city! 
Alan Bloom in "Commerce and Culture" ( This World 
[Fall, 1982]) argues a similar line, but emphasizes the 
revolutionary break from traditional philosophy taken 
by the proponents of commercial republicanism. In 
building on low but solid ground, the emerging bour-
geois civilization defused the dynamite lurking in the 
older perfectionist ideals. In its resplendent utilitarian-
ism, politics and economics came to care for the body, 
and the soul-devoted to virtue and perfection-slipped 
away. It is not as though there was no room for virtue, 
truth, and perfection in the commercial republic; they 
were just edged off the main stage and became thank-
fully irrelevant to economics and politics. The market 
took over center stage and has remained there ever since. 
The modern libertarians of course are in the lineage 
of the commercial republicans. But their orientation 
propounds a cold rationalism rather than the homey 
naturalism of the intellectual architects of the commer-
cial republic. The earlier writers wrote against the back-
drop of the old regime; they knew there were other 
paradigms than the commercial. And they knew the 
losses that came with the shift. Our current commercial 
republicans agree with their progenitors in their view 
of the centrality of the market as the organizing arena 
for most of life, in their animus toward perfectionist 
politics, and in their enthusiasm to extend marginal 
utility theory into family life, law, and politics. The only 
difference is that they are not aware that their applica-
tions drive out the soul. 
I have spent so much time on proponents of the "not 
to worry" school because they are so formidable, not so 
much in their libertarian guise, but in the form of the 
innumerable practical thinkers and actors in our com-
mon life who have done so much to make this a tolerable 
commercial republic. But I think even they may be 
somewhat uneasy with the present state of affairs. Before 
I take up why I think they might be uneasy, though, I 
want to examine the other school, which is such a de-
light to us all. 
"I Told You So " 
This school's view of the relation of the market econ-
omy to the moral order is well known. We hear it re-
The Cresset 
Economic life in market systems is neither as independent of morality as the commercial republicans 
(and today's libertarians) insist nor as opposed to it as their anti-capitalist critics maintain. 
p at dly from many intellectuals of the church, from a 
pr ponderance of liberally educated persons, from 
Marxi t and sociali ts, from many segments of the dis-
advantaged, and from those who claim to represent the 
di advanta ed. This perspective does not agree with 
chumpeter and Bell that the effects of successful cap-
italism may lead to untoward moral and cultural results 
through the melancholy fact that the human race cannot 
handle affluence and freedom at the same time. On the 
contrary, from this perspective capitalist economic 
arrangements-market economies-are in principle 
opposed to the moral life. Conflict between the market 
economy and morality is inescapable. And this school 
certainly does not agree that one can build an adequate 
economy or polity on some trustworthy base below the 
level of morality, as the commercial republicans insist. 
What one will get is indeed low and base. Let me quote 
a former colleague's response to my book: 
Benne is sensitive to flaws in American society. but he lets the sys-
tem off too easily when he locates these flaws primarily in terms of 
personal and social moral character. Americans are in mad pursuit 
of pleasure , self-indulgent , selfish , etc. No doubt that's true. Our 
doctrine of original sin tells us that these flaws lie in human nature. 
What is happening is that the American system-democratic cap-
italism-magnifies these flaws , drives them to extremity, and un-
leashes the rawest kinds of human impulses into the public sector. 
And so class conflicts , racial rivalry , crime, violence, murder, abor-
tion , imperialistic wars, and lots more are the social fallout of a sys-
tem that has worshipped the Golden Calf of capitalist economics. 
There you have it stated with a bit of passion. Market 
economies encourage, legitimate, magnify, and even 
generate human greed. They are poison to human moti-
vation, and the values they spew out are incompatible 
with morality. 
The social effects of the system, rather than the homey 
harmony of the commercial republicans, include the 
generation of inequality, the destruction of community 
before the onslaughts of "possessive individualism," the 
imposition of exorbitant social costs on the most de-
fenseless members of society, and a vulgarized and de-
based culture. 
When such a corrosive system is unleashed on the 
broader world, we get an international social darwinism 
that feeds on the poor and oppressed of the world. The 
little fish are eaten by the big ones, and the system that 
allows that to happen, and in fact encourages it, is the 
international market system-capitalism. 
This perspective is too well known to chronicle 
further. It simply denies that the market economy-
and the polity that combines with it-leads to the kind 
of results the commercial republicans claim. Building 
a system on the lowest common denominator makes the 
lowest normative. Capitalism is antithetical to morality, 
and the only proper response to it is to transform it into 
October, 1983 
some new economic arrangement. 
A Constructive Conversation 
In the following I wish to argue that economic life in 
market systems is neither as independent of morality as the 
commercial republicans (and their latter-day saints- the 
libertarians) aver nor as opposed to it as their anti-capitalist 
critics maintain. (My remarks will not wrestle with that 
anomaly on the intellectual frontier, George Gilder, 
who makes the theological and moral virtues of faith, 
hope, and love the driving springs of capitalism. No 
one quite knows what to make of him.) 
A wise person once told me that the best discussion 
emerges from conversation among friendly critics-
parties who share enough to be able to argue construc-
tively about their differences. I'm a friendly critic of 
the commercial republicans, for I believe their more 
modest expectations for civil life and for history itself 
have led to results that outstrip their expectations. On 
the whole, commercial republics are more attractive 
than any of the perfectionist models; they have achieved 
a more persuasive mix of freedom, tolerance, innova-
tion, social equality, mobility, and general well-being 
than their competitors. They certainly do have their 
glaring flaws and injustices, but their real achievements 
indicate that reformation is a more fitting response than 
transformation. 
These ambiguously positive assessments of demo-
cratic capitalism are characterized by my critics under 
another name-complacency. But I do not believe that 
passion for reform needs to be fueled by dramatically 
unbalanced judgments. Such a stolid attitude probably 
betrays my social position and implicit self-definition. 
I fancy myself something of an intellectual of th p opl 
and of the laity-the middling men and worn n in so-
ciety and church who carry on the day-to-day work of 
our common existence. Perhap there i a ve tigial bit 
of that Nebraska spirit in me that drove Roman Hru ka, 
a fittingly anonymous senator from that stat , to ar 
that Harold Carswell should be nam d to th 
bri f thin a t th radi al 
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The self must be nurtured, loved, educated, introduced into civilization by a community of persons-
first the family in its nuclear and extended form, but beyond that by friends, school, and church. 
critics. First, I find their assessments of American demo-
cratic capitalism terribly unbalanced. They tend to play 
the game unfairly, I believe. They simply lop off all the 
achievements and exaggerate the evils. Anyone can 
"prove" this country to be a monstrosity by focusing on 
the dark underside of American life. But certainly there 
is much more than that, or we would have more radical 
politics than we have. 
Second, they tend to demonize self-interest in an 
unhelpful and, I believe, hypocritical way. Any human 
being possesses a certain power of being that is e-2\pressed 
toward the world through a quest for survival, pleasure, 
love, friendship, new experience, meaning, achieve-
ment, salvation. Every self has a set of interests that are 
pushed into the world. The market coordinates many of 
these for the human community in rather remarkable 
ways. Most of our mutually beneficial exchanges are 
very routine and uncontentious. No great moral di-
mensions are attached to them. But business makes the 
big mistake of being too honest. It talks of profits and 
returns, and these words have been made to symbolize 
greed by the "I Told You So" crowd. Meanwhile, how-
ever, the "I Told You So" people generally play very 
well in the m_arket game. (One of the most vocal anti-
capitalists in our Chicago neighborhood-a Lutheran 
pastor-led the local investment club and was, I am 
told, very good at it.) Moreover, the self-interest ex-
pressed in their chosen vocations is often disguised un-
der more high-sounding terms like "professional dis-
tinction," "service" to this or that institution, the 
"search for truth," or "fighting for justice." Self-interest 
is present in all expressions of human being; it need be 
neither praiseworthy nor blameworthy. We can all 
admit to it without using it as a moral club with which 
to beat our ideological opponents. 
Third, this camp generally underestimates the reality 
of the workably competitive markets operating in this 
country. They are therefore unaware of the expertise, 
persistence, and discipline it takes to survive in th~ 
marketplace. This makes them underestimate how much 
that market restrains self-interest and bends it to the 
good of customers and consumers. The "I Told You So" 
crowd tends to think that the market is a congeries of 
political clout and privilege; you really don't have to 
gain success in it the old-fashioned way-by earning it. 
As one harassed businessman told a theologian after a 
spirited ~xchange: "Let's have you start a business and 
see it through for a couple of years. Then let's come 
back and see if you make the same criticisms." 
Now, having offered a few arguments against those 
that see a built-in opposition between the market econ-
omy and the moral order, let us spend more time in 
dialogue with the spirit of commercial republicanism, 
which continues to pervade mainstream economic 
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theory and practice in thi count 
camp should have riou orri v 
sult from its neglect of th moral- o ial ord r. 
A Non-Historical View of the elf 
I started my description of the ot To Worry" 
school by reporting the confidence it ha that people 
can be trusted to follow their elf-interest in way rather 
healthy to themselves and others, if they act them out 
freely in a market context. They know their own sur-
vival needs accurately; they can order them rationally 
and figure out the prudent ways to get them. The pro-
ductive apparatus will respond to those preferences, 
and producers, if held accountable by a competitive 
market, will supply them well. All of this goes on with 
little or no guidance from the moral-social order. It 
operates beneath the moral level. 
Such a non-historical view of human beings is a 
faulty one-it does not account for the moral predispo-
sitions it takes to make a market system work effectively 
on the production side, or the predispositions it takes 
for persons to select survival v~lues as preferences on 
the consumption side. In either case, the moral predis-
positions are the products of communities that form and 
shape the self. Selves are not exclusively the products 
of social history, but they are dramatically conditioned 
by their social context. The self must be nurtured, 
loved, educated, introduced into civilization by a com-
munity of persons-first the family in its nuclear and 
extended form, but beyond that by friends, school, and 
church. These communities convey those moral pre-
dispositions to developing selves, providing them with 
a guidance system · for both their productive and con-
suming lives. 
There never was such a thing as unbridled capital-
ism. There may have been times when there were few 
external limits to developing enterprises, but if Max 
Weber is right about the connection between Calvinism 
and capitalism, there was a good deal of Calvinist moral 
guidance involved in capitalist development. Also, the 
great medieval Catholic moral tradition operated as a 
backdrop before which Calvinism could make its re-
visions. The capacity for promise-making and promise-
keeping beyond the tribe was a moral precondition for 
market systems to develop, and those religious and 
moral traditions nurtured them. 
There is more to say about morality and the produc-
tive side of life. But first I want to dwell more intently 
on the consumption side. The question is this: can per-
sons really register life-enhancing preferences in the 
marketplace without a healthily functioning moral 
order, as the "not to worry" people suggest? Or do there 
exist capacities for real self-destruction? 
The Cresset 
We are withdrawing the nurturing context from our young. We have nearly abdicated bringing them 
up. The young are bringing themselves up. And the results are scarily visible all around us. 
m rican ciety today is a great testing ground for 
r ol ing th questions. For I believe we are with-
drawin th nurturing context from our young. We 
h av nearly abdicated bringing them up. The young 
are bringing themselves up. And the results are visible 
to anyone around young people a lot, such as those em-
ployed by colleges and universities. 
One of the jarring new experiences I have had in 
moving from seminary to college comes from the en-
counter with r eally unhinged young people. Many 
faculty are shielded from this experience because they 
are often the last people the disoriented young will 
come to. But they will come to chaplains and faculty if 
those persons give off signals of availability and com-
passion. And the reports I get from these persons are 
rather alarming: aimlessness and boredom, loneliness, 
lack of self esteem and purpose issuing in suicidal 
threats, gestures, and serious attempts. Widespread use 
and abuse of alcohol and drugs trigger the self-destruc-
tive impulses. Not all students are unhinged of course; 
students from small towns and rural areas seem to fare 
better than the metropolitans. Traditional culture is 
stronger there. But among the metropolitan middle 
and upper-middle educated classes, the news is bad. 
Both mother and dad are working and have done so 
for a long time. Families do not eat, worship, or play 
together, let alone converse seriously. There are num-
erous family breakups in the background of these 
troubled kids. Or deep estrangement issuing in infidel-
ity or an undertow of disaffection. There is a surprising 
amount of sexual abuse. The churches provide little 
authority or structured nurture for them; the churches 
themselves are confused about moral norms. Schools 
have long since withdrawn from the formation of char-
acter and the teaching of ethics; they have a hard enough 
time with teaching basic skills. Colleges were frightened 
out of their in loco parentis role in the late Sixties and 
early Seventies. So much for their confidence in inher-
ited standards of excellence and moral virtue. They 
stand by as students get bombed at mid-week parties 
and miss classes the next day. Faculty members be-
musedly retreat from the din-sometimes called music 
-and sexual disorder that students bathe themselves in. 
What is left? At earlier stages of life television is the 
teacher; long hours before the tube become the way our 
young are introduced to the adult world. It is a world of 
dishonest advertising, galloping consumerism, leering 
sexuality, stereotyped shadows of human beings, imme-
diate gratification, sexual relations normally unmarked 
by restraint and long-term fidelity , the glorification of 
the abnormal and rebellious. Such attempts a are made 
at portraying the healthy and conventional tend to be 
sentimental and phony. 
Why is thi stuff elected out of televi ion market 
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offerings? Why does it sell? Perhaps because there are 
no serious alternatives; the moral order is on its way 
toward disintegration. Persons emerging from this 
chaotic social context will not be productive agents in 
the world nor will they select noble human values from 
the offerings that the market provides. 
Later on the shaping community becomes the world 
of peers. High school and college kids lead each other; 
and by and large it is the blind leading the blind. The 
kids will tolerate almost anything from their peers be-
cause they have little beyond them to make judgments 
about them. (By the way, please do not take this to mean 
that Roanoke College has a more serious problem than 
other schools. I do not believe that is true ; in fact , we 
may be ahead of others by facing up to it more directly.) 
Joseph Schumpeter noticed what I am trying to point 
to back in the early Forties, and he said it so well that I 
want to quote him at some length. H e is talking about 
the decomposition of the motivational system of capital-
ism through the socialization of the bourgeois mind, 
a process that he believed would eventually kill capital-
ism's motivational roots. 
As soon as men and women [ notice hi s early inclusiveness I learn the 
utilita rian lesson and refuse to take for granted the traditional 
arrangements that their social environment makes for them. as soon 
as they acquire the habit of weighing the individual advantages and 
disadvantages of any prospective cou rse of action-or a we might 
put it . as soon as they introduce into their private life a sort of inar-
ticulate system of cost accounti ng-they cannot fail to become aware 
of the heavy personal sacrifices that fami ly ties and especially par-
enthood entail under modern conditions and of the fact that at the 
same time child ren cease to be economic assets . 
Schumpeter goes on to argue that this kind of co t ac-
counting is most certainly wrong, for: 
The greatest of the assets . the contribution made by parenthood to 
physical and moral health-to "normality" as we might exprc it -
particularly in the case of women. almost invariably e ap s th 
rational searchl ight of modern individuals who tend to fo us att ·n-
tion on ascertai nable details of immediate utilitarian rel vane and 
to sneer at the idea of hidden necessities of human natur or of th 
social organism . These individual ask "Why hould we tunt our 
ambitions and impoverish our live in order to b insulted and 
looked down upon in our old age? " (Cap1talzsm, . ocialzsm and 
Democracy, pp. 157-158 ). 
We cannot have an ad quat m ral 
respon ible parenthood and fami ly lif . ann t hav 
a functioning mark t y t m without a h alth m ral 
order. Economic ha · a I t to d ith that rd r and w 
mu t worry about it. 
Freedom 
ur latt r-da c mm r ial r publi 
freedom and if I r ad p pl lik 
corr tl y, that i f r th m th prima 
erv d and t nd d. w I agr \ ith mu h 
I would not want to argue that prudential morality is not a powerful reality or that it is 
unnecessary. It is real and necessary. But it is not sufficient and we are finding that out. 
argument but I think that human are even more free 
than they think and their truncated version of human 
freedom underestimates the capacity for both creativity 
and sin in their interpretation of human action. This 
leaves their economic philosophy with a certain blind-
ness toward human will-to-power that operates in all 
dimensions of human existence, including the economic. 
They tend to underestimate power relationships in the 
marketplace. 
The commercial republicans do know about self-
interest in economic life, and they do think it is best 
disciplined by competition, but there is an intimation 
that the market can indeed handle that self-interest be-
cause prudent reason, when faced by competition, will 
submit to its discipline. Further, the prudent reason of 
individuals is projected onto large enterprises. Com-
mercial republicans often argue that corporations are 
only collections of individuals and that they act like an 
individual writ large. Thus, this economic outlook 
tends to be unaware of the driving will-to-power in indi-
vidual, but especially, corporate economic life. 
I quoted Tocqueville earlier to the effect that the 
commercial classes have little violent political passion 
because their excitement on small matters makes them 
calm about great ones. But when economic life is carried 
on by giants, excitement funneled through those large 
entities is no longer a small matter. It can overrun other 
competitors, individuals, governments, whole countries. 
Enterprises are not only larger than those of Tocque-
ville's day, but the human spirit is larger than our eco-
nomic philosophy assumes and its excitement can be 
more harmful and evil than expected. That is because 
human freedom is indeterminate. It is self-transcending 
freedom that seeks ultimate security but at the same time 
knows death is its fate. Anxiety is our lot as centers of 
self-transcendence. But, as Ernest Becker argued, we all 
are engaged in strategies that deny death. We attach 
ourselves to winners who for the moment can fend off 
the overwhelming insignificance and mortality that is 
ours. The commercial republicans knew this was true 
of religious and political life, but they didn't think it 
operated in economic life, because that dealt with mild-
er ambitions and passions. 
The story of John DeLorean should dash that fond 
illusion in individual life, and the story of ITT's be-
havior in Chile should dash it at the corporate level. 
Those stories could be multiplied. The point i that 
indeterminate will-to-power is expressed through eco-
nomic life, especially in its corporate form, and it will 
seek to override the restraints of the market or find 
places where there are no market restraints. Economic 
power is no less dangerous than political; sin operate 
there too. And in societies where the church and the 
polis have been pushed to the periphery by the market 
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a an rganizing paradigm, on mi \ ill-t - ,. r ma 
be ev n mor dan rou . 
hat i the up hot of thi rd r? ir t 
that the moral- ocial ord r an pr id int rnal r -
straints on individual that th mark t it lf cann t 
provide. The John DeLorean ,. ill not be d terr d by 
the di cipline of the market. econd th polity, r fl t-
ing the values of the moral order, mu t often be um-
moned to limit economic-will-to-power in a commercial 
republic. Economic freedom is more dangerou than th 
Friedmans of the world maintain, and its restraint mu t 
often come from beyond the market. 
Prudential Morality 
The economic philosophy of latter-day commercial 
republicanism overestimates the capacity of prudential 
morality to sustain a market economy. In trying to oper-
ate at the low and solid level beneath morality, its moral 
theory-sometimes called marginal utility theory-is 
really a kind of ethical egoism. It is prudential morality 
which, as Immanuel Kant argued, is not really morality 
in its strictist sense because it engages in right action 
under threat of loss or hope for gain. Public exposure, 
loss of customers, disapproval of others, or legal penal-
ties prove counter to one's interest so actions that lead 
to such results are avoided. Conversely, actions which 
lead to the opposite are engaged in. 
I for one would not want to argue that prudential 
morality is not a powerful reality or that it is unneces-
sary. It is real and necessary. But it is not sufficient and 
we are finding that out. We are becoming more and 
more aware of two gaps in economic life that are not 
handled by prudential morality. 
The first gap is between what the law says is pro-
hibited and what the law actually uncovers and punishes. 
In an increasingly complex and massive society, that 
gap is painfully real. Violent crimes are often unsolved 
and unpunished. But the myriad of non-violent "white 
collar" and "boardroom" crimes are even harder to de-
tect and punish. For the most part, crime does pay. 
Prudential morality is not very persuasive here. If the 
risks are assessed and found to be less than the benefits 
gained, prudence may push one toward the illegal. 
My conversations with business people over the years 
convince me that many moral problems arise for them 
when they are told by their firms to engage in illegal 
behavior because there is little chance of getting caught. 
This indicates the failure of prudential morality as it i 
practiced by the leadership of those firms. 
A econd gap is that between legally and morally per-
mis ible behavior For example, it may not be illegal for 
insurance alespersons to ell highly limited health and 
life in urance policies to elderly per on who are not 
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The need for ethically sensitive persons in business is being recognized by our businesses and 
colleges, but these institutions must build upon character formed earlier by the moral-social order. 
awar of tho limitation . o doubt the limits are there 
in th fin print. o doubt, if asked, the salesperson will 
alm t tell th truth. But the fine print is not read and 
th qu lion are not a ked. And many of these policies 
ar old. (I my elf feel almost helpless before the exper-
ti of a good insurance salesperson.) An authentically 
moral per on would not engage in such selling, but the 
prudentiali t might well. 
Both of these gaps illustrate that there must be inter-
nal re ources in the actor that provide moral guidance. 
The web of external interactions may not suffice. Moral 
character must fill these gaps, and that comes only from 
formation in the moral-social order. Only those persons 
who act for intrinsic reasons can be trusted in such situa-
tions. An executive I know is in charge of deciding 
whether his firm will enter foreign markets. Many of 
these markets are in countries where graft is the order 
of the day; it may even be legal under the laws of those 
lands. He will engage in some such operations, but he 
has a set of intuitive limits. As he puts it, "If I start play-
ing with skunks, I start smelling like one, and I don't 
like myself." He has internal restraint. 
We are even more dependent on moral character 
from beyond the market-place when we look for the 
generation of moral idealism rather than just moral re-
straint. Who will be able to imagine a more expansive 
picture of business responsibility, who will be attuned 
to the genuine human needs of employees, who will take 
risks of moral leadership? Certainly not the prudential-
ists. 
The need for ethically sensitive persons in business 
is being recognized by our businesses, colleges, and uni-
versities, but these institutions must build upon char-
acter that is formed earlier by the moral-social order. 
In summary, I have sought to engage in a friendly 
argument with the spirit of commercial republicanism, 
a spirit that has tried to shape economic theory and 
practice independent of morality. Or at least it has tried 
to make it less dependent on morality than is warranted. 
Therefore, it has not worried as much as it ought about 
the moral order. This fault, I have maintained, stems 
from its rather non-historical view of human nature, its 
naturalistic view of human freedom, and its exces ive 
reliance on prudential morality. In short, it does not 
recognize the indispensability of a healthy moral order. 
That order forms character toward life-enhancing 
values and preferences, tames and directs the longings 
of a free human spirit into constructive channel , and 
provides an inner set of moral restraint and a pirations. 
In order to end with con tructive uggestions I offer 
the following: 
1. Economic theory mu t be revi ed to take a more 
hi torical view of human nature. The in titutionali t 
chool ha much to offer here. Likewi , th in i ht of 
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Marx, without the determinist and dialectical dogma, 
will be of use. 
2. Colleges like ourselves must insist on broad liberal 
arts education. By that I mean those in the humanities 
must also study economics, and vice versa. The liberal 
arts vision of educating the whole person was never 
more crucial than it is today. Further, faculty on our 
campuses should be about the kind of dialog that over-
comes the centrifugal forces of modern learning. 
3. Above all, we must devote ourselves to strengthen-
ing the institutions that constitute the moral-social or-
der. We must begin with our families, for that is where 
formation is most powerful. We simply have to spend 
more time and energy on nurture. Our schools must be 
able to engage in moral education that is not narrowly 
sectarian. Our churches must devote more structured 
ministry to the young. And our church colleges must 
encourage and enrich the virtue of those who arrive 
with it, and initiate it in those who don't. Cl 
Emmy 
And he who sat upon the throne 
said, "Behold, I make all things 
new." Revelation 21 :15. 
Over the cracked bronze clay of Georgia 
North to Promised Land's cemented city, 
telling dreams and children both , "Endure!", 
she fought. While eastward th y at waiting. 
Then more of culling gold from R v lati n. 
More of feeding children dream , and m r 
cajoling green from clay left over. till , 
as time ran out, th y waited. 
First her timid tapping, th n th p uncling. 
Finally her tubborn a king at half- p n d 
doors. udd nly, a f w how 1 om d and, 
a promi ed, all thin 
Oh uch hymn 
Oh such flow r t 
laughing from th h u 
painting it ild Ra pb rry f r th ir waiting. 
Lois Reiner 
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Why Film Studies Gets No Respect 
Taking Movies Seriously 
Movies seem to be the only topic that gets a conversa-
tion rolling as effectively among my academic friends 
and colleagues as among the folks back home. In fact, 
once the discussion turns to a recent film, it's hard to tell 
apart these two usually quite distinct social worlds. 
Scholastics take to the topic as enthusiastically ~s non-
academic friends and family, who, by the same token, 
swap judgments about movies as confidently and knowl-
edgeably as do the intellectuals. To break through the 
pall of polite chatter, whether about Derrida and dis-
sertations on the one hand or church doings, TV, and 
Aunt Edna's surgery on the other, just mention the 
latest Hollywood enticement. I can't count the number 
of times I've seen this work. The most recent was at a 
lunch with members of a doctoral seminar in American 
literature; for all their common departmental concerns 
and weeks of joint reading and inquiry, this group of 
advanced graduate students, scholars, and literary edi-
tors found movies to be the only subject they could 
discuss with vigor. 
An encouraging fact, perhaps, for we happy few spe-
cializing in film study, but not for reasons one would 
likely guess. Because whatever it might seem, the way 
intellectuals talk about movies is a sign not of an intel-
lectually serious attitude toward film, but of the oppo-
site: a pervasive and persistent weakness in the status 
accorded film by intellectual culture, and not just in 
idle conversation either. In fact, if we look more closely 
at such conversation we see merely the shadow of a 
struggle that has gone on for decades and that goes on 
still at the very highest levels of film criticism and schol-
arship. It is a struggle over just how to go about taking 
movies seriously. 
I 
Academics in established disciplines normally respect 
Since gr~duating from Valparaiso University in 1980, Jeff 
Smith has been studying film in the Department of English 
at the University of Chicago, where he received an M.A. in 
1981. At Valparaiso, he edited both the student newspaper 
and the student literary magazine. At Chicago, he is super-
visor of the Film Study Center. He has taught courses in Film 
both at the University of Illinois-Chicago and in the Exten-
sion Program of the University of Chicago. 
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Jeff Smith 
each other's expertise. If they learn you are a peciali t 
in the early Victorian novel (a popular medium in its 
own time, of course, just like film), any judgments they 
make on that subject will be carefully marked as "sub-
jective." A comment like "I couldn't stand Barry Ly n-
don" means, "I didn't enjoy reading Barry Ly ndon but 
[or even, therefore ( !)] would never doubt that, as a 
Text, it merits your serious attention." (Needless to say, 
non-academics, also ~ware that these are matters for ex-
perts, are even more circumspect about them and won't 
normally have even a "subjective" opinion to offer.) 
But to identify your specialty as film is to invite the 
opposite to happen. Here the response might be, "Oh, 
did you see Superman Ill?" and from that moment no 
one present will be bashful with opinions. In this con-
text, "I couldn't stand Barry Lyndon" means simply, 
Barry Lyndon was a bad, if not worthless, movie, and 
never mind whether any or all knowledgeable critics 
disagree about that. In fact, you will have little chance 
to refer to this body of opinion, since your own knowl-
edge will be mined only for arcana, or inside dope-as 
though all students of film must naturally be subscribers 
to Reel Life. (People who learn of my own formal train-
ing in film typically ask me questions that call less on 
that training than on what I can remember from the 
Sunday supplements.) Even more likely you will be 
asked if you aim to make films, a question whose impli-
cations should be tediously familiar to most English 
majors, tired as they are of explaining to non-academics 
that literary studies aren't some kind of pre-vocational 
training to write novels. In fact, what becomes clear is 
that the value of film study as a discipline unto itself is 
understood by intellectuals about as well as humanistic 
studies generally are grasped by the public at large. 
Partly this may owe to the fact that movies are cur-
rent and one of the few cultural products held in com-
mon, even (or especially) among educated people. Also, 
it must be said that some distinction still exists between 
"high" or serious-usually European-film and the 
standard, mass Hollywood product. But these facts 
themselves are part of what needs explaining. And any-
way, neither point holds up perfectly. The distinction 
between "art" and Hollywood films is not as carefully 
honored as, say, that between serious recent writing and 
pulp fiction. And it seldom seems that other matters of 
current or common knowledge provoke the same re-
sponse as the movies. Psychology and linguistics also 
deal with phenomena we all know, yet experts and lay-
men in these fields have little trouble distinguishing 
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Auteur critics showed that many .. hack" directors had actually brought considerable unity of 
outlook and consistency of style to the ""trashy" commercial projects the studios had given them. 
ach other. nd though a historian of the Johnson pres-
idency or a political scientist studying the West Bank 
might encounter strong opinions touching his or her 
field , till it always seems that academics hold such 
opinion conditionally, with a general willingness to 
acknowledge the legitimacy of the discipline itself and 
it canons, and above all the possibility of expertise. 
It is precisely this acknowledgement that intellectual 
culture denies film. A literary scholar might be well 
aware that Faulkner wrote screenplays, and that some 
of the greatest minds of this century have recorded their 
appreciation for movies. But he will praise or vilify 
Superman III just as readily nonetheless, and with no 
apologies for any lack of formal film training. Superman 
III doesn 't fall into the same category of conversation as 
Faulkner. For most academics it's more like faculty 
gossip or the weather, certainly not something that has 
to be studied to be discussed. We might be tempted to 
say that while everybody talks about the movies, nobody 
ever does anything about them. 
II 
This half-joking paraphrase might seem easily re-
futed by the decades of intensive study film has received, 
not only from film specialists but from some of the most 
eminent scholars in other disciplines as well. The intel-
lectual world seems to have been taking film seriously 
for some time. By 1934, the year the famous Princeton 
art historian Erwin Panofsky published his landmark 
essay, "Style and Medium in the Motion Pictures," it 
was certainly established that movies-not just abstruse, 
experimental foreign films, but movies-might be a fit 
topic for discussion by leading academics. 
Actually, though, this essay tends to reveal the truth 
of my little paraphrase. We can appreciate Panofsky's 
boldly arguing, against what he assumed (probably cor-
rectly) to be widespread opposition to the idea, that 
films are indeed art-in fact, one of the few really vital 
modern arts precisely because of their mass appeal: 
If all the serious lyrical poets, composers, painters a nd sculptors 
were forced by law to stop their activities , a rather small fraction of 
the general public would become aware of the fact and a sti ll smaller 
fraction would seriously regret it. If the same thing were to hap~e~ 
with the movies the social consequences would be catastrophic. 
But in Panofsky's view this cultural vitality was bound 
up with the fact that movies were a "folk art. " Panofsky's 
way of justifying the movies was to argue that the very 
1 From the reprint of the Pan of sky essay ( 194 7 revision) in Gerald 
Mast and Marshall Cohen. ed s .. Film Theory and Criticism, 2nd ed. 
(Oxford Univ. Press , 1979 ). O ther essays that I cite and that are re-
printed in thi s anthology are: usan Sontag, " Film and Theatre." 
1966 ; Andrew Sarri s, " otes on the Auteur T heory in 196 2"; and 
Pauline Kael, "Circles and quares ." 1963. Italics in all quote are 
the authors'. 
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qualities that had called their artistic value into question 
were really the source of their worth. As against an elite 
art like painting, Panofsky saw movies as being con-
strained by the demands of the market and the hard, 
inviolable reality of the objects photographed. This 
meant that films were "arrangements" of material things 
rather than projections of some abstract concept in "the 
artist 's mind." And this was their glory. The response 
of movies to these constraints was to discover their folk-
ish appeal. 
Obviously Panofsky's praise was somewhat patroniz-
ing; according to Susan Sontag, it paralleled a "vaguely 
Marxist" condescension toward the movies' "vast un-
educated audience." Certainly it did nothing to increase 
appreciation for the film artist , whose importance in the 
making of a Hollywood movie Panofsky explicitly 
denied. This is the sense in which , for Panofsky, talking 
about film was indeed like talking about the weather , 
another vital factor in people's lives that no one creates 
and no one can much affect. Or at best, to use his own 
analogy, filmmaking was like cathedral-building : the 
producer is the archbishop, the director the chief archi-
tect, and on down the production/construction hier-
archy. Something like this view evidentl y pr vailed 
for many years, judging from the fact that many Holly-
wood filmmakers were as little known and honored in 
their time as medieval architects. 
The fact that this has changed , and that today criti 
greatly honor many of those ame filmmakers, is larg ly 
due to the so-called " auteur" (auth o r) th ory that 
emerged in France in the 1950 . Auteuri m wa an ex-
plicit effort to take the film artist eri ously. R j cting 
Panofsky's "folk art" way of justifying movi s, whi h 
essentially denied that a work needed a ingl arti 't in 
order to have value as art , auteur critic argued that 
even Hollywood studio film did have arti t - u uall y, 
their directors- and they wer ea ily able to ·h w that 
many directors previou ly con id r cl "ha k ·" had a -
tually brought considerable unity of u tl ok and on-
sistency of tyle to the "trashy" ommer ial pr j t th 
studios had given them . · a r ult , th r "pan-
theon of film director " alled for by ndr w 
leading American auteuri t, ha n ,. larg I b n 
lished. 
In language a b ld a Pan f ky' arris pr d 
the up hot of th n w att itud - an attitud d cl t 
do e the gap b tw n appr iating H II w 
and b ing in tell tually · ri u · a ut film : 
Like mo t Am ncan who tak film riou Iv . I have al\\·avs f · It a 
cultural inf rionty comp! ·x about Hollywcx>d. Ju t a f ·w y :ars ago . 
I would hav thought 1t unthinkabl lo peak in th· am br ·ath of a 
"commercial" d1r tor like Hitchcock and a "pur·" dir·clor li k · 
Bre on Ev n toclav zght and ound u · diff ·r ·nt type iz . ., for 
Bre on and H itchcock fi lm After y ·ars of tortured r •valuation I 
am now pr par d t tak my critical r pulation. u h a it i . on th · 
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It has been argued that if we looked at movies the way we read serious literature, we would 
pay more attention to the story as the real substance of the work and the source of its value. 
proposition that Alfred Hitchcock is artistically uperior to Robert 
Bresson by every criterion of excellence and , further, that , film for 
film , director for director. the American cinema has been consist-
ently superior to that of the rest of the world from 1915 [to the pre -
ent]. Consequently , I now regard the auteur theory primarily as a 
critical device for recording the history of the American cinema, the 
only cinema in the world worth exploring in depth beneath. the frost-
ing of a few great directors at the top. 
As influential as this view has been, it too had problems. 
Since they were rediscovering overlooked directors, the 
auteurists had a tendency (not unlike Panofsky's) to 
place value on the very limitations and constraints that 
had led to neglect of those directors in the first place. 
Unlike Panofsky, the auteurists did credit individual 
artists rather than "the medium" itself with finding ways 
around the constraints. But still they took less joy in 
filmmakers who created or controlled their own proj-
ects than in sheep who had been lost and were now 
found. As Pauline Kael put it: 
Their ideal auteur is the man who signs a long-term contract, directs 
any script that's handed to him, and expresses himself by shoving 
bits of style up the crevasses of the plots ... . The director who fights 
to do something he cares about is a square. 
Poor Dostoevsky, Kael mocked, "too full of what he has 
to say" and "tackling important themes in each work" -
if the auteurist "inside dopesters" got hold of literature, 
he would be discarded in favor of some forgotten hack 
from the Saturday Evening Post. 
Today's pervasively auteurist criticism has responded 
to this charge by evolving a slightly different sort of 
perversity. If film critics today no longer place value on 
the fact of constraint, it is because this fact has almost 
been forgotten. Typically any Hollywood director is 
now assumed to be an auteur, and his work the outcome 
of a conscious artistic strategy and vision. Kael's remark 
that "these critics work embarrassingly hard trying to 
give some semblance of intellectual respectability to a 
preoccupation with mindless, repetitious commercial 
products" seems even more apt with regard to what one 
reads today in the Village Voice, where Andrew Sarris 
still presides, and in similar trendy journals for the in-
crowd of upscale young (which journals, after all, must 
find ways to take seriously their readers' pop-culture 
tastes). 
But the remark applies as well to the work of countless 
contemporary film critics. If Panofsky took film art ser-
iously at the expense of the artists, the auteurist main-
stream of today tends to take some artists seriously at the 
expense of the art. It tends overwhelmingly to judge 
film by self-contained criteria-criteria, that is, derived 
from and applicable only to film. Such a situation nat-
urally leads either to "inside dope" or to the disease of 
many newspaper film critics, for whom inchoate per-
sonal reactions ("This movie made me feel good") pass 
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a criticism. 
n obviou olution would b to d v lop an appr ach 
to film using criteria rooted in om lar r of 
cultural or artistic value beyond film. Th b t r nt 
film writing has in different way tried to do thi . It ha 
argued that movies mu t be looked at in ju t uch a 
larger context in order to be taken really eriou ly. In 
his new book on Howard Hawk , a favorite redi covered 
filmmaker of the auteurists, Gerald Mast echoes Paul-
ine Kael's complaints about the auteurists and further 
adds that film theory in general has overvalued the 
idea of directorial "style" at the expense of film stories. 
If we looked at movies the way we read serious litera-
ture, says Mast, we would pay more attention to the 
story as the real substance of the work and the source 
of its value: 
Jane Austen's Emma is admired as a rich , important human work , 
not solely for its carefully structured action, deeply and subtly ob-
served characters , and gracefully perceptive writing but for the very 
depth . ironies, and complexities of the moral system that permeates 
it. .. Part of Jane Austen's reputation as a writer can be traced to 
her ability to construct such a complex and insightful moral universe 
as her means to elaborate her story of one woman's discovery . The 
moral and philosophical seriousness of Shakespeare's Othello stems 
from the same squrce-the elaboration of a rich moral universe 
through action and character, based on human issues which are 
enormously complicated and important.2 
Bringing the same values to bear on the filmmaker in 
question gives us this simple formula: "To demonstrate 
that Hawks is of any value is to demonstrate that he 
told good stories." And in turn, says Mast, this means 
showing that he conveyed "a view of human life and 
aspiration that is serious and complex," however little 
this view calls attention to itself amid the seemingly 
simple materials of Hawks' popular comedies, Westerns, 
or war pictures. 
Just by feeling he needs to argue all this, Mast con-
firms the persistent strength of film criticism's self-
containing tendency. But in a different way Mast's judg-
ments, too, are self-contained. When it comes to actually 
analyzing Hawks' films, Mast may be generally applying 
the standards of serious literary study, but he shows 
little interest in drawing particular connections between 
Hawks' recurring themes and issues and those of the 
literature or culture of the era. He does little to locate 
Hawks in this kind of larger scheme of intellectual and 
cultural concerns. 
Mast is very good on the "social" history of movies, 
the history of their changing relations with TV, govern-
ment, the Legion of Decency, and so forth (his other 
recent book is the first serious collection of source docu-
ments on this subject). But his views on cultural history 
are limited by his sense that the great artist of all per-
iods, a Shake peare or an Austen as much a a Hawk 
2 
a t, Howard Hawks, toryteller(Oxford niv . Pre . 1982 ). p. 34. 
The Cresset 
In analyzing movies, Stanley Cavel/ frequently writes as though the actors were not 
tools of an artist but rather real people speaking and behaving without premeditation. 
p rform ntially the ame act; all are just basically 
great torytellers in touch with universal issues common 
to all epoch . Mast tells us less, therefore, about the 
relation of the given artist to the art and thought of an 
age-why a Hawks in particular chose certain of these 
i ue to deal with in this particular way. Mast means us 
to take Hawk seriously as a cultural figure; he makes a 
point of noting that Hawks was friends with "two of the 
greate t American literary minds of his age," Heming-
way and Faulkner, and that therefore "it seems quite 
probable that those minds accepted Hawks as 'one of 
us."' But this scarcely locates Hawks within the larger 
scheme of twentieth-century thought- that is, in the 
kind of scheme in which we are accustomed to locating 
figures like Hemingway and Faulkner. 
Of course, any number of studies are published on 
Hemingway and Faulkner without explicit reference to 
intellectual history. But it is taken for granted that as 
serious writers, Hemingway and Faulkner are intellec-
tual history. Actually Mast's argument lacks nothing in 
itself, but we do miss the more explicit connections to 
intellectual culture given that film art has not yet been 
accepted as self-evidently a part of that culture. How-
ever seriously Mast himself takes movies, it is not clear 
that his approach will convince academics outside film 
study to do so. 
Perhaps Mast, who was trained in serious literature 
but has come to teach and write mainly about film, is 
not the sort of critic to perform this service. And of 
course we also cannot count on scholars like Panofsky, 
who leave their established fields only for brief forays 
into film. Perhaps the best hope would be a scholar who 
stayed within an established discipline but also made a 
sustained study of film from that discipline's perspec-
tive. We have just such a figure in Stanley Cavell, a 
Harvard philosopher who writes with equal facility and 
interest about Wittgenstein and the Cary Grant/Kather-
ine Hepburn screwball comedy. Cavell is able to bring 
to bear on the latter the profoundest philosophical in-
sights gleaned from studying the former, and the result 
is criticism that makes movies sound like very serious 
documents indeed. 
For Cavell, to talk about Howard Hawks is to talk not 
only (as for Mast) about Shakespeare, but also about 
Kant, Nietzsche, Freud, Hume, Locke, and Matthew 
Arnold, not to mention empiricism, New Comedy, and 
"the worldhood of the world"-and very possibly in 
just that order. To talk film, in fact, is to do philosophy. 
Cavell advocates more rigorous "readings" than are 
usually done of the "low" or "typical" instances of film 
art (i.e. Hollywood), not just for their own ake but al o 
because the importance of movie in our live , and the 
fact that intellectuals and other folks care about movie 
in similar way , are them elve phenomena that de erv 
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explaining. Cavell proposes not just to bring Heidegger 
into the film curriculum but, when discussing Heid-
egger, to bring Buster Keaton before the faculty of 
philosophy: 
My juxtaposition of Kant and Capra [ a popular studio director of the 
Thirties and Forties] is meant to suggest that you cannot know the 
answer to the question of worthwhileness in advance of your own 
experience. not the worthwhileness of Capra and not that of Kant. . .. 
I am not, in the case of Capra, simply counting on our capacity for 
bringing our wild intelligence to bear on just about anything. say 
our capacities for exploring or improvi~ation. What we are to see is 
the intelligence that a film has already. brought to bear in its making; 
and hence perhaps we will think about what improvisation is and 
about what importance is. 
This essay, gathered with others last year in Cavell's 
book Pursuits of Happiness, shows not only his character-
istic complexity (Cavell teaching us how to look at films 
philosophically in order to permit them to teach us how 
they should be looked at in order to confirm what phil-
osophy teaches us about looking at things, etc.); it also 
indicates what connecting film with serious thought 
loses for Cavell in terms of the idea of film as erious 
art. The reference to Capra notwithstanding, Cav 11 
tends as much as Panofsky to suppre s the role of the 
artist in his discussions of movies. It is "the film" that 
brings intelligence to bear, just as he often speaks of "the 
film's preoccupations" or "the world of the film." 
In analyzing movies Cavell frequently writ a 
though the actors were not tools of an arti t but rath r 
real people speaking and behaving without prem dita-
tion. (Indeed, Cavell's theoretical writings tr the 
capacity of film to make us invi ible ob crver of v nt .) 
Pursuits of Happiness is a "genre" tudy; Cav ll ee · th 
films it discusses as indeed r fleeting th · riou i u 
of a given time and culture, and in thi r p t h 
specific about cultural hi tory in th way that rald 
Mast isn't. But Cavell pays for thi with hi la k of Ma t' 
superior insight into the kill and techniqu f th arti t. 
In Cavell's handling the veral film by vari u · dir -
tors become almost on up r-film , ·in a h i 
expressing the same t of cultural on rn · qually a · 
well as the other . Cavell ha admitt d that it am a 
"a clarifying shock to realiz that film w r dir t d ' 
at all when the auteuri t fir t mad a p int of thi fa t. 
"I certainly felt rebuked form ba h ardn s · in ha in r 
grown to fatherhood without r all kn " ing wh r 
movie came from. " But th h k, in t ad f m 
him to take up an int r t in film auth r , I d 
rather to mull ov r th qu ti n f what it i ab 
that allo" d p pl 
JS 
It is fine to study film artists' works as folk icons, artifacts, epiphenomena, or universal truths, 
but in other arts this has been done with the stature of those artists first assumed and assured. 
about any mental artifact of Western man, simply be-
cause the things they thought about and said inform all 
of our thinking. Cavell's basic assumption-and here the 
philosophers among us might recall that he has studied 
Wittgenstein-resembles a view quite popular in this 
century, which has seen sophisticated theories applied 
to every kind of mental product from billboards to nur-
sery rhymes to psychotic fantasies. 
Whatever their differences with Cavell in some higher 
realm of theory, which there is no need to get into here, 
essentially this same view lies behind the film ~riticism 
done in recent years under various "schools" or rubrics 
-linguistic and semiotic, structuralist, psychoanalytic, 
Marxist, feminist. On the surface, critics of these schools 
take the critical task seriously to the point of being 
humorless or even reproachful. Their aim may be a 
"scientific" analysis of film, or, what for them is often 
the same thing, a singularly rigorous application to 
movies of a particular philosophy like Marx's or Freud's. 
But even when the result is not stilted "technese" or 
jargon-ridden orthodoxy, in the hands of such critics 
film tends to remain an artifact instead of an art. And 
not necessarily (as for Cavell) a socially beneficial arti-
fact at that: the filmmaker is as likely to turn up in such 
criticism as a henchman of sexual repression, patriarchal 
dominance, the bourgeoisie, or all of these at once-
anything but as an individual whose vision of life de-
mands careful study in terms of its evolution and des-
tiny. 
III 
I have tried to stress that each of these critics means 
to take movies seriously, and each has contributed worth-
ily to what ultimately could be a really serious perspec-
tive on the subject. But there is a difference between 
being serious about something and taking it seriously. 
Swift was hardly serious in "A Modest Proposal," though 
he took the plight of Ireland very seriously; and on the 
other hand, as suggested above, a serious analysis of 
something like a TV commercial can be ( and maybe 
must be) done by someone who would not for a moment 
take seriously the advertiser's claims. This is why, even 
though the serious criticism of any art is the sum of 
various methods and attitudes much like those de-
scribed above, we cannot yet say that the , various ap-
proaches taken toward film add up- to a situation in 
which intellectual culture takes film seriously. 
With film a crucial premise, implicit in even the nar-
rowest critical study of the "serious" arts, is still lacking. 
We will not be able to say that intellectual culture really 
takes film seriously until it comes to treat film art as part 
of itself, like other arts. And for this to happen scholars 
must admit filmmakers, the best ones anyway, to mem-
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bership in that cultur mu t a rd filmm k r th 
same status that the greate t arti t 
times scholar them el e ar ac rd d a r at r and 
not just reflectors of cultural hi tory. For tart r thi 
will mean taking a eriou inter t a rald Ma t do , 
in filmmakers' actual idea but furthermore in how th y 
get those ideas. Whether the an w r lie in int llectual 
or psychological biographie or imply in th book 
they've read, this question will have to be a ked about 
filmmakers as explicitly as it ha long been asked about 
poets and novelists.3 It is fine to break down and study 
artists' works as folk icons, artifacts, epiphenomena, or 
universal truths, but in other arts this has been done 
with the stature of those artists first assumed and assured 
-a condition that has not yet been met in the case of 
film artists. 
A final factor that illustrates as well as aggravates the 
low status of film is, of course, the university curriculum. 
Film remains less well-established in the curriculum 
than is usually supposed. It is only slowly moving 
through the stage that literary study endured a hundred 
years ago, when it was not universally agreed that lit-
erary judgments could be kept intellectually serious 
or that literature even constituted the "collective biog-
raphy of the national mind." According to John Gross, 
literature had to be "smuggled" into universities dis-
guised as philology, 4 and today we often see film study 
come in disguised as linguistics (or semiotics). Film 
study has not reached what Gross calls the stage of "full 
trade-unionization" that English literature had achieved 
by 1925, but rather is still practiced even in academe by 
"men of letters" (and a modern equivalent, the prac-
ticing filmmaker) who are segregated from the "real" 
disciplines in "schools of the arts." (Andrew Sarris, with 
no more than a B.A., holds forth from a full professor-
ship in such a school as Columbia. 5 ) And where it is in 
the hands of genuine academics, as at the University of 
Chicago, film is not regarded institutionally with the 
same seriousness as established studies. One could hard-
3 
An example of this, but obviously not a very characteristic or influen-
tial one, is Raymond Durgnat's discussion in The Strange Case of 
Alfred Hitchcock (MIT Press, 1974) of possible Jansenist influences 
in Hitchcock's childhood. There have also been useful discussions by 
critics of, say, Zen influences on Japanese directors or Swedish Lu-
theranism's on Bergman. but then foreign filmmakers have been taken 
more seriously from the beginning, since critics have the advantage 
of distance. 
4
Gross's discussion of "Early English" in The Rise and Fall of the Man 
of Letters (Penguin, 1973) suggests all sorts of parallels with modern 
film study-as when Gross notes the special resistance by Oxbridge 
to English lit. : "Everything about the subject was suspect: it was 
modern. it was enticing, it was bound to be the softest of soft options." 
5Th · · e s1tuat10n may be different in , say . France, where historically 
closer connections between film and intellectual culture have often 
been noted. In any case , the problem of professors with B.A.s will be 
resolved by the year 2000 when one-third the population of the West-
ern world holds the Ph .D. 
The Cresset 
We can only expect film to come into its own when some filmmaker arises whom the intellectual 
world regards with the greatest seriousness, initially for reasons having nothing to do with film. 
1 gradual fr m the Engli h department, which har-
b r film tudy at Chicago, without studying a novel, 
p m, and play from each major literary period, but 
b th ur and exam requirements permit students to 
tak th Ph.D. without once looking at a film. 
u h in titutional attitudes undoubtedly contribute 
to th la k of eriousness my fellow students, at least, 
bring to movie , and presumably an institutional change 
in thi re ard would have a corresponding effect on 
sherry-hour chitchat. But such change itself will be 
tardy or ineffectual without a solution to the original 
problem, the attitude toward film of intellectual culture 
a a whole. We are till left with the question, When will 
movie really be taken seriously? It seems to me that 
there are three conditions under which they might be, 
hence three ways for movies to achieve first-class citizen-
ship among the arts. 
One way (alas, the most likely) is for film as we know 
it to die out under the onslaught of, say, home video, as 
some now predict will happen. This would relegate 
film to the past, neutralize its cultural vitality, and so 
make it suddenly respectable. It is the same principle 
according to which classical and Continental authors 
could be seriously studied before English, and Euro-
pean filmmakers before American - since the former in 
each case enjoyed what John Gross calls "the academi-
cally privileged status of foreigners." 
The second and far less likely possibility is that film 
study be legitimized by some unimpeachable weight of 
authority, some Great Teacher whose word becomes 
orthodoxy on a wide range of subjects. It will not do 
simply to have a Marx or a Freud whose teachings are 
applied after the fact to every sort of subject including 
film; I have indicated what sort of polemics that kind of 
thing tends to give us. Rather, to legitimize film this 
Great Teacher will have to explicitly affirm its value. 
What we need is a Plato who, while banishing poets, 
demands to keep movies in his Republic; or at least a 
Socrates who will pose the question, "We have films, do 
we not?" (Gorgias: "Indeed, Socrates. Seen any good 
ones lately?") A modern Aristotle penning a De Cine-
matica might suffice where simply another Cavell or 
Panofsky cannot. But to say this is also to indicate why 
it will not happen. Aristotle was inventing disciplines; 
in today's climate of specialization new studies must 
compete at a disadvantage with those already estab-
lished, and in this match authority naturally weighs in 
against film study. There will be no Aristotle for film 
because there will be no more Aristotles, and even if 
there were, it is not clear that film could resist being 
digested by the Cavellian deep-meanings-are-every-
where assumption that comes so easily to the modern 
mind. 
The last po sibility may be the most unlikely and yet 
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paradoxically, the only one worth hoping for as a prac-
tical matter. If Aristotelian authority has disintegrated, 
well, by virtue of that very fact the modern world nour-
ishes all the more its cult of individual genius. Relying 
on this fact, we can expect film to come into its own when 
some filmmaker arises whom the intellectual world re-
gards with the greatest seriousness, initially for reasons 
having nothing to do with film. This will have to be such 
a creative mind as the world has never before seen. It 
cannot simply be a minor intellectual working in Holly-
wood (like Terence Malick), nor a popular filmmaker 
with an intellectual bent (like Stanley Kubrick), nor an 
important artist making the occasional offbeat film (like 
Samuel Beckett), nor even such an artist writing "ser-
ious" scripts for popular films (like Harold Pinter). No, 
to get movies taken seriously there must emerge a figure 
whose career in film is no accident, whose success at 
producing and directing locks in his Hollywood cre-
dentials, and who in altogether separate artistic/intel-
lectual endeavor attains at least the stature of a T.S. 
Eliot. (This because of my sense that an artist or thinker 
must rise at least to this status for the cult of genius to 
come into full play.) The films of this individual will 
initially be pored over for the same rea~ons that the 
letters, diaries, grade-school notebooks and other relics 
of geniuses are. But the hope is that the very fact of a 
genius having taken mass-market Hollywood movies 
seriously as a medium for personal expres ion will 
finally impress itself enough on all the archivi t , text 
editors, dissertation-writers, and other academic train-
carriers and true believers to get the point aero . 
I say "the hope," although the ble ing will ur ly b 
mixed. As I said at the beginning, it is certainly pos ible 
to find today's robust interest in movie encouraging in 
its very lack of seriousnes . A hundred year ago litera-
ture likewise permeated culture and wa activ ly di -
cussed; one recent commentator ha n.ot d th parall 1 
between the way film are talk d about o ially today 
and the way Victorian gentlemen c uld all b xp t d 
to read and talk about the ame book . It i n t 1 ar that 
"serious" literature ha mad an advan by b ming 
the province of speciali t . p cialized di u ion i what 
weighs down ocial gathering . Int 11 tual n d p pu-
lar culture a a realm of thing about whi h th y p r-
mit themselve and each other to p ak with ut d -
mantling badge of xp rti . It would b a ham if 
movie could not b taken ri u I \ ith ut takin 
11 all "th burd n f 
for wi <lorn on upennan III, and wh n 
movi no lon r li n up th part . 
w 11 h oray f r H 11 ,,; d. 
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A New Assignment for a Traditional Discipline 
Computers and the Future of Music Education 
Our culture seems to be perpetually locked into "rev-
olutions," but it is hard to imagine a revolution more 
compelling and complete than the current revolution 
in computer technology. New hardware is developed 
with dizzying speed, and with equal speed becomes 
obsolete. As musicians, many of us like to feign ·immu-
nity to the encroachment of modern civilization, yet 
the day of reckoning cannot be far off. With computers 
becoming commonplace even in grade schools, and with 
the challenges of retrenchment forcing most of us to 
broaden our perspectives, it is no longer reasonable to 
plan curricula for future generations of musicians and 
music educators without consideration of this burgeon-
ing technology. 
Computers have already made strong inroads in 
many music departments. Their effectiveness in stream-
lining administrative procedures has enticed even 
smaller and more conservative departments to install 
computers for records keeping and word processing. 
More moderate (or better endowed) departments ex-
plore methods of administering examinations and drills 
using computers, and at the larger universities use of 
computers for music composition is a well-established 
mode of research. 
Computer applications in music composition have 
been available for more than a quarter-century. Two 
strikingly divergent, yet not mutually exclusive, ap-
proaches are found. Some composers have sought to 
employ computers for the calculation of complex com-
positional algorithms. In particular, computers afford 
the composer a much greater precision in determining 
the probability of particular events occuring in a com-
position. The precompositional calculations required 
of the composer can be significantly reduced. One of 
the first, and most famous, examples of this approach 
was Lejaren Hiller and Leonard Isaacson's 1957 Illiac 
Suite for string quartet. The details of the score were 
Keith Paulson-Thorp is Assistant Professor of Music Theory 
and Composition at the University of Southwestern Louisiana, 
Lafayette. He holds a D.M.A. from the University of Illinois 
and is the author of The Contemporary Harpsichord: A 
Guide for Performers and Composers, soon to be re-




generated on the Illiac computer at th niversity of 
Illinois, Urbana. Unlike in later compositional pro-
cedures employing computer calculations, uch a the 
renowned "stochastic" music of Iannis Xenaki , in the 
Illiac Suite stylistic restraints were not prescribed by 
the programmer, but were generated randomly by the 
computer. 
Many composers have felt that relegation of detail to 
the operations of a computer is a rejection of a neces-
sary compositional responsibility and have chosen to 
concern themselves more with computer generation of 
sounds than with computer generation of compositional 
programs. For years, the sounds attainable from a com-
puter lacked the depth and versatility of those gener-
ated by analog synthesizers (such as those manufactured 
by Moog, Buchla, etc.), but there is no longer reason to 
expect that computers in the year 2000 will not be ca-
pable of producing with stunning precision virtually any 
sound imaginable. While the programs required for 
good sound generation are almost prohibitively com-
plex, as the state of the art develops even this obstacle 
can be expected to disappear. 
Obviously, composers constitute only a fraction of 
the music community. Performers have become inter-
ested in computer technology as a means of real-time 
sound generation. This development has been much 
slower in coming than have compositional applications. 
It was, in the past, necessary to store a music either in 
the form of a program stored in computer memory to 
be entered at a terminal, or one to be realized in final 
form and stored on magnetic tape. Such canned ver-
sions of music leave little space for performer inter-
action. By the end of the current year, several com-
panies will have taken strides to remove this obstacle 
with the introduction of two Apple-compatible systems, 
Alpha Syntauri and Soundchaser, and one manufac-
tured by Commodore for its computers. These hard-
ware modules entail multivoice keyboards (with up to 
sixteen voices) which operate in conjunction with com-
puter control terminals. The computer, with its phe-
nomenal sophistication of control capability and mem-
ory, will be as accessible to performers as are the 
portable analog synthesizers that have proliferated in 
the popular music market during the past decade. 
While the applications cited above may affect the 
activities of composition and performance, they do not 
directly affect music education. While the tools might 
be different, the tasks involved are the same types of 
The Cresset 
Some researchers have suggested that the understanding of how our minds process information 
as abstract as that involved in music listening may be the key to artificial intelligence itself. 
mu i al a tiviti with which we have always dealt, 
nam ly n tru tion, labeling, and exe,::ution. As such, 
th han implied are uperficial, for if computer 
te hnology i to have a ignificant impact on music as a 
whol , it mu t have some contribution to make to the 
way in which we understand a piece of music and the 
way in which we educate others to understand music. 
The mo t far-reaching implications of computer appli-
cation in music may come in the area of instruction, 
and from insights garnered in research into artificial 
intelligence. Some researchers have gone so far as to 
ugge t that the understanding of how our minds process 
information as abstract as that involved in music listen-
ing may be the key to artificial intelligence itself. 
At present, the field of computer-assisted instruction 
in music is at an embryonic stage. There are several 
reasons for this. The first concerns the complexity of 
programs required for the generation of musical sounds 
and music graphics. While this complexity has attracted 
many computer enthusiasts with its challenge, it has 
been necessarily limited in the degree of complexity of 
musical examples produced. Another problem is more 
fundamental, and concerns the lack of precision with 
which most musicians approach the intellectual proc-
esses of their craft and the inability of theorists to de-
velop and implement realistic models of musical com-
petence from which experimental programs might be 
developed. 
Many larger computer firms have developed pro-
grams to assist in music instruction. Some of these com-
panies have focused on the design of self-contained and 
highly specialized units. One of the most impressive of 
these machines is the Exercette computer manufactured 
in Canada. In place of the standard typewriter (ASCII) 
keyset, the Exercette is equipped with a touch-sensitive 
grid and a small LED read-out. The student places a 
cardboard screen over the grid, which identifies the 
functions performed by the remaining grid areas. The 
tasks which a student may attempt involve most of the 
simpler cognitive skills stressed in the first year or two 
of a college ear-training curriculum, skills such as ele-
mentary interval recognition, chord quality and short 
chord progression identification, etc. A few more com-
plex chord structures, such as dominant and dimin-
ished seventh chords, are included as the student pro-
gresses. The sound quality of the machine, though 
obviously electronic, is quite adequate and the example 
played sound clearly and recognizably. 
The Exercette is very u eful in the flexibility of pacing 
it allows. A student may a k to have an example r -
peated as many times a necessary, and for harmonic 
examples he may at any time reque t to have the tonic 
chord sounded for the key in which the exampl i 
functioning. Such repetition may prove annoying to 
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more advanced students in a classroom situation, but 
on an individual basis, they can reduce frustration and 
improve confidence for less gifted students. 
The drawbacks of the Exercette are common to most 
essays in music instruction. While the examples may, 
in themselves, be of general practical value, it is impos-
sible for the computer to simulate an actual listening 
experience. The discontexted and isolated nature of the 
exercise may preclude the transference of skills de-
veloped to more realistic contexts. In traditional ear-
training, for example, professors have often found that 
students become so accustomed to the sound of dicta-
tion played at the piano that the students' success factor 
drops alarmingly when they are asked to identify struc-
tures played on other instrument . Even if a stud nt 
can recognize short examples at a computer, there i 
no guarantee that he will recognize the sam tructure 
embedded in a Mozart symphony. 
Second, while the student may be learning to apply 
labels and visual forms to sound structur , he i not 
anxiou 
f th 




If we do not demand precision of thought from our students (and from ourselves) when speaking 
about music, how can we reasonably expect logical decisions regarding interpretation to ensue? 
puter. While most of pple' comp titor have retain d 
licen ing and marketing right for compatible oftwar 
Apple ha allowed compatible oftware for their com-
puters to develop on an open market thu taking ad-
vantage of an abundance of creativity at large. umer-
ous companies now specialize in various pple-com-
patible softwares (the most notable of the e for musi-
cians being Micro Music Inc.), and several universities 
have developed exceptional Apple-compatible software 
which may be available for distribution in the near 
future. Such flexibility is not without its price, however, 
for Apple has remained comfortably aloof from the 
recent price wars that have brought the cost of home 
computers within the budget of the masses. A single 
Apple terminal with the necessary disk module, display 
module, etc. will run at least two thousand dollars. Con-
sidering, however, that the Exercette is in the same price 
range but without the flexibility of the Apple system, 
this is not really out of line. 
Most of the software available from these larger com-
panies involves the same basic cognitive tasks available 
on the self-contained units as well as tasks dealing with 
vocabulary identification (particularly of foreign terms), 
and even programs which enable the user to devise 
elementary tunes. While one might be easily impressed 
with the sophistication of the graphics and sound avail-
able in this software, one must still wonder if there is 
not more that computers may be able to offer musicians. 
The ultimate determination of how we may wish 
computers to contribute to music education will hinge 
on our ability to discern more precisely how it is that 
humans learn to interpret musical information. Until 
we know how the musical mind is programmed, we will 
not be able to program computers to assist in any truly 
efficient way. Such concerns would have seemed totally 
irrelevant only a few decades ago. We have usually been 
content to churn out musical sounds and scores and to 
label them with much the same mindless alacrity as that 
with which a butcher might stuff and market sausages. 
The success of our endeavors depends largely on the 
snob appeal our services may afford and on the mystical 
aura in which we so carefully enshroud our work. 
The president of a major New York conservatory re-
cently claimed that the job of his institution was to teach 
students to do, not to enjoy, music. Such insistence on 
music as a physical rather than a mental activity is ram-
pant, and is ultimately stifling to music as an art. It is 
arguable, moreover, that people seldom excel at those 
things which they do not enjoy, and that they seldom 
enjoy those things which they are unable to understand. 
The interpretation of sounds as music, after all, occurs 
in the brain, where musical sounds are detached from 
the larger body of current perceptions and filtered 
through our individual repertoires of remembered 
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completely delet d at man chool w mu t find way 
of drawing music into the larger p trum of human 
understanding and of re torin academic r p tability 
within the profes ion. 
A representative of a major computer firm r cently 
remarked that his company's intere t in the develop-
ment and marketing of music software was imped d by 
the fact that musicians them elve could not agree on 
important issues. As a result, programs are u ually re-
stricted to those which deal with more absolute com-
ponents such as interval and triad quality identification. 
Unfortunately, much music education fails ever to go 
beyond these lower level processes. This avoidance of 
intellectual concepts arises from the general opinion 
offered above that such concepts are not germane to 
music (or that musicians are not mentally equipped to 
handle difficult concepts) and is then evidenced by a 
lack of precision in musical terminology. Precision by 
no means implies that we must adopt a universally ac-
ceptable vocabulary, but rather that terms, when they 
are employed, must be carefully defined for a given 
application. In order to function logically, a definition 
must be of the form "A if and only if B" where reciproc-
ity is explicit. Musicians often allow sets of attributes or 
circumstances to function as definitions. 
For example, while works which might be catego-
rized as "artistic" may evoke an emotional response, it is 
not true that all things which elicit emotional responses 
are "artistic" in nature. Sufficient data has not been 
expounded to create a definition, and the criterion of 
emotional response cannot adequately serve to define 
what is meant by "artistic." Such meaningless usages 
abound in musical parlance. If we do not demand pre-
cision of thought from our students ( and from our-
selves) when speaking about music, how can we reason-
ably expect logical decisions regarding interpretation 
to ensue? Too often musical decisions are rooted in the 
assumption that if things have always been done, or 
seem to have been done, in a given manner then they 
must necessarily always be done in that manner. Re-
evaluation of traditional approaches is not attempted. 
Precision of terminology can open for students new 
modes of thought and inquiry which will expand their 
musical perspectives and stimulate creative approache 
to listening and performance. Students can be chal-
lenged to question the way they have labeled and ex-
amined musical structure in the pa t. 
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Those who are able to think and make decisions rationally, rather than on the basis of 
primitive reactions, will be the ones who will carry the music profession into the next century. 
T rminology i but the tip of the iceberg, for pre-
i i n f thought r quire not only a finely honed vo-
cabulary but al o a olid foundation in logic. In music, 
mor than on logical sy tern i required if we are to 
und r tand what we are doing. While classical truth-
functional logic may apply in the manner in which we 
define and apply terminology, there is much evidence 
to ugge t that logical modalities (i.e., necessity/possi-
bility, obligation/ permission, etc.) are required to ex-
plain the manner in which we actually make sense of 
music in time. What is needed is a music curriculum 
which combines the essentials of music with the essen-
tials of logic, and which demonstrates the close correla-
tion between the two. A pioneering effort in this direc-
tion has been made possible by the recent work of Jos 
Kunst at the Utrecht Institute for Sonology. Kunst, in 
his treatise Making Sense in Music (Utrecht, 1978), has 
developed a methodology for applying logical modal-
ities to the analysis of musical processing. His theory 
has the advantage of being able to incorporate analytical 
procedures specific to virtually any harmonic, rhythmic, 
or melodic system. Kunst's ideas may eventually lift 
musical thought out of the quagmire of more popular 
Schenkerian and set-theory approaches to music that 
have consistently reached dead ends. 
There are two ways in which computers may assist 
us in attaining this desired fusion of materials. The first 
approach would delegate the teaching of basic labeling 
tasks to computer-assisted instruction, thus removing 
from professors the burden of dealing with black and 
white concepts and freeing them for more concentra-
tion on the application of logical processes in actual 
works of music. The realization of this approach would 
be in sight only if the majority of college teachers would 
be willing to retrain. The second approach would 
patently incorporate logically-based concepts within 
computer-assisted instruction. By this method a more 
standardized approach would result which might avoid 
some of the difficulties created when professors are ill-
equipped to deal with intrinsically non-musical ma-
terials. Computers, moreover, have the advantage of 
being able to respond interactively to individual prob-
lems, and of offering enlightening commentary when a 
mistake is made, in a way that is difficult to ensure in a 
classroom situation. Each student's progress and areas 
of weakness can be closely monitored and recorded. 
Obviously, if we are to develop software which will 
fuse music, logic, and related sciences into a cohesive 
whole, we cannot leave sole responsibility for program 
design in the hands of computer specialists, but must 
diversify into those areas ourselves. We have long been 
willing to accept the formulations of amateur mu ician , 
many of whom have not had sufficient experience to 
have disposed of naive preconceptions, while we it idly 
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by. We should be able to expect that those who write 
music commentary and music-oriented computer pro-
grams have adequate training. We must likewise not 
permit ourselves to delve into complementary fields 
without adequate preparation, even when those fields 
become indispensible to our own work. Courses in logic, 
mathematics, acoustics, and computer science must be-
come a standard part of a music educator's training. 
Music majors tend to be a xenophobic lot, jealously 
guarding what they perceive to be the uniqueness of 
their art and resisting the temptation to explore. Music 
is one of the few majors where a minor outside of the 
principle field is not required. Because of the enormous 
load of courses required for most music degrees, there 
would be little time for development in other disciplines 
even if a student were so inclined. When courses in the 
sciences are required, students are left to choose from a 
bewildering array, not knowing which courses might be 
most pertinent to their major field. What is worse, most 
departments have designed courses to provide non-
majors with a painless fulfillment of general require-
ments. Seldom are these classes worthwhile. If the 
sciences were introduced in a meaningful way as part 
of the music curriculum, students might be better pre-
pared to select the most useful course in fulfilling their 
general requirements. In addition, we might find means 
for preparing students for a wider variety of care r 
possibilities in a discipline which merciles ly pigeon-
holes those who enter it , and which ha long suffered 
from a shortage of jobs. 
If computers cannot pose a complete olution to th 
problem of curricular integration in music, th y at 
least present some interesting option as weJ 1 a th 
opportunity to try new direction . In ·olving xi ting 
problems, new ones invariably ari e and hallenging 
solutions are demanded. The rapid acceleration f thi · 
cycle in music is not unprecedent d , but it i rtainly 
unusual. 
In adapting education to the wave · of futur ~ ·tud nt · 
who will have been weaned on comput r t hnology, 
the greatest challenge i to tho of u wh mu t ur-
selves, after years of tudying mu ·i , b om ·tud nt 
once more in foreign discipline . In a pting thi hal-
lenge, we may be better pr par d to hall ng our tu-
dents to train th ir mind a w 11 a th •i r fing r . \: 
n xt entury. 





Persona I ity 
Richard Lee 
A sabbatical happily allows a little 
time for reading outside one's field, 
so I recently read my University's 
catalog from cover to cover. As one 
of my Cambridge students had cau-
tioned me, it is everything you ever 
wanted to know about Valparaiso 
University but were afraid to ask. 
On the last page is this provocative 
statement summing up all that we 
are and are doing: 
. a growing and maturing private Uni-
versity of academic excellence operating 
within the Lutheran tradition , whose pur-
pose is the development of an effective 
Christian personality that will leave its 
mark throughout society. 
Setting aside slight problems of syn-
tax, the statement seems to me un-
exceptionable. I find nothing amiss 
in the University having psycholog-
ical designs upon its students as long 
as it is frank and open about what is 
obviously a dangerous business, the 
"development" of other people's 
personalities. Such a statement, how-
ever, must be followed by the most 
important question ever asked with-
in the Lutheran tradition- the ven-
erable ca'techetical question "What 
does this mean?" 
That there is a "Christian person-
ality" appropriate to 'the Lutheran 
tradition" I have no doubt. I also 
think it exceedingly difficult to say 
what that personality is, much le s 
what an "effective" one might be. 
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But if difficult qu ti n 
on worth a kin th n the qu ti n 
of the R formation per nalit i 
urely worth meditatin(T on in thi 
month' abbatical diary b the 
gentle River Cam. 
ear the 500th anniver ary of hi 
birth, I think it no di credit to Lu-
ther to ay at once that his per on-
ality is not the per onality we mean, 
partly because hi personality i o 
embedded in late medievalism but 
mo tly because no one per on can 
be the type of the Reformation per-
sonality. It has long been a consola-
tion of the Lutheran tradition that 
one need not be like Luther to be 
Lutheran. Our question seeks a type, 
not an historical model. 
The answer likely lies in what the 
Reformation did to the very condi-
tions of personhood. Like it or not, 
the Reformation uprooted person-
hood grounded in the natural, tri-
bal, semi-Pelagian religion of the 
late medieval world. When one visits 
the monuments and artifacts of that 
world here in England, for example, 
one is struck by how commonsensi-
cal and communal that religious 
world must have been for each per-
son. His apparent virtue was con-
firmed, his apparent vice shriven, 
and a whole community, including 
a sacramental God, could help pull 
him through his life toward the sal-
vation of his soul. Perhaps no doc-
trine sums up the situation of medie-
val personhood better than the gen-
tle doctrine of purgatory. Even be-
yond death a person could be helped 
by his family, the Blessed Virgin, 
and all the saints. In life and death 
you never walked alone, and the 
religious demands upon you were 
always more or less tolerably within 
your means and those of your com-
munity. 
The Reformation countered these 
commonsensical and communal 
conditions of per onhood and set 
each person more individually be-
fore God and under the mo t awe-
some claims concerning both the 
depths of his in and the grace of 
God in Christ for him. It i a if each 
person were natched out of the 
choru to sing olo or plucked from 
him lf. 
Luth r p ibl r tat th 
ca for a hri tian' cl ath (lik hi 
bapti m) i till don within th 
whole ch ring compan f heaven 
and be id Chri t going b fore him 
but the individual accountability of 
each oul before God cannot be 
denied a the religiou ly con tituent 
part of the Reformation p r onality. 
That personality i grounded sola 
upon the audacious Reformation 
claims concerning both the absolute 
judgment and the total grace of God, 
and the way of faith for each soul is 
now necessarily through the crisis of 
doubt because of the very audacity 
of those claims. The Reformation 
upped the ante of personal doubt 
even as it raised the bid for personal 
faith. 
Insofar as religion is one of the 
conditions of personhood, the Ref-
ormation personality is probably 
inclined toward skepticism about 
everything short of God Himself, 
some distrust of sweet reasonable-
ness, a tendency to see communities 
formed by individuals (rather than 
the reverse), a disposition to see life 
constituted in critical decisions 
(rather than process), and a certain 
grave joy taken in one's vocation. 
We all know the possible aberrations 
of this personality type, but given 
the range of possible human per-
sonalities it is not the worst one. My 
University apparently considers 
some such personality a desirable 
one to develop in its students. Cer-
tainly students receive fair warning 
that such is the University's purpose, 
although everything in the catalog 
"is for information only and does 
not constitute a contract between the 
tudent and the University." 
The next question-how the Uni-
versity actually develops such a per-
onality, particularly so as to "leave 
its mark throughout society" -
would seem to me a que tion to 
occupy many mind far better than 
mine for a long long time. Cl 
The Cresset 
Television 
Women In the News 
Christine Craft's Case 
Highlights Some Problems 
And Hides Some Others 
James Combs 
Women are in the news. I mean 
that in both senses: women are news, 
and women in the news are news. In 
the former instance, we now have 
much discussion-and rightly so-
about the attitudinal and electoral 
"gender gap" between men and 
women. The gender gap is virtually 
unprecedented, and it makes poli-
ticians uncomfortable because it 
introduces yet another joker into the 
deck of election returns. Consider 
this: in the August national polls, 
President Reagan had the approval 
rating of about 51 per cent of adult 
males, but had dropped eight more 
points among women, with only 34 
per cent of adult females approving 
him. 
Males and females seem to divide 
sharply on a wide variety of issues. 
And women are now more likely 
than ever to vote (they are register-
ing in heavy numbers), and to vote 
independent of the opinions of sig-
nificant males (father, husband, 
brother) in their lives. Reagan 
doesn't help himself with some of 
his ill-considered offhand remarks, 
but then perhaps no politician could 
totally please women activists of 
whatever ideological stripe. We are 
James Combs, The Cresset 's regular 
Television cn:tic, is spending the current 
semester as a visiting professor in the 
Department of Political Science at the 
University of Tennessee. 
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Women are in the news-in more than one sense. 
Women are news, and women in the news are news. 
simply living in an age of rising ex-
pectations among women, and those 
expectations-jobs, careers, govern-
ment services, political recognition, 
and vaguer things such as independ-
ence and fulfillment- may outrun 
the ability of politicians to deliver. 
There is even among some women 
(on both Right and Left) consider-
able distrust of all male politicians 
( and maybe even of males in gen-
eral, which I must admit is probably 
not totally unwarranted), since they 
don't "really understand." 
If it is the case that we live in an 
age of the politicization of the battle 
of the sexes (including homosexual 
politics), then we are faced with a 
new dimension of the age-old strug-
gle of men and women to under-
stand, get along with, and even in a 
few notable cases genuinely to love 
each otl~er. Men and women are, 
after all, physical and emotional 
mysteries to one another, and to the 
extent that relationships between 
them are complicated by considera-
tions of power, the mystery- and the 
alienation- is compounded. I have 
recently heard both young women 
and young men seriously say that 
they doubt that a simple, happy, and 
lasting relationship between the sexes 
is possible any more: men and wom-
en have conflicting and irreconcil-
able expectations, don't trust each 
other, see the other as a threat to 
their identity, and so on. Contem-
porary men, for example, will often 
say that they just · don't know what 
to expect of women these day ; not 
knowing, they shy away, are u pi-
cious and uncertain, and fearful of 
commitment. Many women may 
well experience the same thing. uch 
people are ca ualtie in the exual 
revolution, victim of hi torical 
change in the rol tru tur f 
society. 
till uch p riod of xual rol 
redefinition are exciting (if puzz-
ling), invigoratin (if xhau tin ) 
and probably all in all b n fi ial (if 
ometime individuall d tru tiv ). 
In historical change, somebody al-
ways gets hurt. The victims are 
those lonely and confused souls who 
don't know any more what to make 
of the opposite sex. But there are 
also all those bright and suddenly 
ambitious women who will make 
their mark on the world, and who 
have also managed to negotiate 
more satisfying relationships with 
men. Since times of abrupt change 
aren't easy, it is quite understand-
able that people split badly over 
what should be done, both individ-
ually and socially. If individual men 
and women can't work out their dif-
ferences (over, for example, house-
hold duties), imagine how hard it is 
to get any consensus on social policy: 
abortion, equal rights, political rep-
resentation - the list is endless. 
The basic individual and 
political question is, how 
should women be treated? 
The basic individual and political 
question is, how hould women b 
treated? One a sum that mo t 
women want to b treat d human ly 
and equitably, but that till d n 't 
an wer the que tion. nd in 
question i under on id rabl 
pute, ymbolic ca e ari -in n-
versation and th ma m dia-
which illu trat th onfli t and th 
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The most obvious dilemma for news stations involves their freedom to fire or 
demote newspersons if they become unpopular or, for that matter, simply older. 
will recall, is the television news-
woman who was demoted at KMBC-
TV in Kansas City because the mvn-
ers, a media conglomerate called 
Metromedia, did audience surveys 
which concluded that she was frump-
ily dressed, opinionated, and lacked 
"warmth and comfort"; the station's 
news director told her she was "un-
attractive, too old, and not def eren-
tial to men" (presumably those on 
the show). She sued, contending 
that she was hired for her journalis-
tic skills, not her sex appeal, youth, 
fashionability, or feminine def er-
ence to the male "leaders" on the 
news show. She won, gaining 
$500,000 in damages, $375,000 of 
which was back pay. She had made 
a convincing case that Metromedia 
had hired her under false pretenses, 
had practiced sex discrimination, 
and had violated equal pay laws. 
How far-reaching the case will be, 
both in the media industry and with-
out, is unclear, and there may be 
appeals. But the Craft case causes 
much handwringing and reflection. 
The most obvious dilemma for 
news stations involves their freedom 
to fire or demote newspersons if they 
become unpopular or, for that mat-
ter, simply older. The Craft case 
reminds us that TV news is cosmetic 
in several senses, not the least of 
which is that the news is usually read 
by pretty faces, male as well as fe-
male. Flip around the channels in 
competitive media markets, and 
look at all that blow-dried hair, 
those cleft and youthful male chins, 
squared shoulders, and athletic 
builds: how many ugly men do you 
see on local news programs? Or 
think of all those stand-ups before 
a Minicarµ at city hall, an accident, 
or a political rally by all those young 
women who look like they just 
stepped out of the pages of Glamour 
magazine. Some are the graduates of 
journalism schools, some not; some 
are intelligent, some not; some are 
competent, some not; but nearly all 
are photogenic, and groomed for the 
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part. To speak of "journalistic kills" 
in a visual entertainment medium i 
almost ludicrous, given the tate of 
the art-and the audience-of TV 
news. The Craft case was, to be sure, 
a particularly blatant one, but not 
atypical of what TV news is all about. 
Unlike Craft, most TV newswomen 
- and newsmen- are willing to play 
the game according to the conven-
tional rules. 
The game is both a lucrative and 
glamorous one for those who play it 
well. Craft's back pay should give 
us some clue, but listen to this: local 
TV news and weather people in 
large media markets are paid more 
than Presidents, more than the 
heads of many large corporations, 
more, even, than their own bosses 
at the station or company. Half a 
million dollars and more a year is 
not uncommon for anchors at such 
stations. Yet the stations contend 
that it's worth it: getting the right 
"formula" for TV news in Houston, 
Chicago, or New York means mil-
lions in advertising revenue. Metro-
media clearly had something other 
than journalistic skills in mind 
when it wanted Christine Craft to 
groom her appearance. That such 
practices are sexist (it works both 
ways: handsome men attract female 
viewers) is indisputable; but then 
that wouldn't be the first time that 
greed won out over humane, or even 
professional, values. In such a cyni-
cal and manipulative world, the 
ethical question that women, and 
men, are nagged with is, what am I 
willing to do for money, fame, 
power, and ambition? How do I re-
tain my integrity in a world of cos-
metic values? How should I be 
treated? 
It is true that TV news practices 
are counter-balanced by other fac-
tors, such as the constant criticism 
they get (from such as me) for the 
frivolous and idiotic aspects of news 
programming. But remember the 
dilemma they are in: no matter what 
the law, critics, or journalism school 
rhetoric a h y ar till tu k with 
attracting and holdin an audi n 
that may not hare the value and 
concern of elites. Th ystem doe 
not alway work again t women's 
interest . There are a lot more wom-
en in TV news now than there used 
to be becau e people want to see 
women deliver the news. Local sta-
tions, for example, have dramati-
cally increased the number of women 
anchors over the past decade; wom-
en now routinely cover the big net-
work beats (the White House, the 
State Department); and more wom-
en than ever before get sent out on 
important and dangerous assign-
ments. And how many local stations 
still have weather girls? 
The Craft case, then, points up 
many of the complications and 
choices concerning the treatment of 
women in the media business. There 
is something else we should remem-
ber as well. The Craft case illus-
trates the extent to which TV news is 
concerned with itself. The mass 
media is very self-conscious, aware 
of its own power and glamour, and 
fascinated by stories that concern 
news people. The symbolic drama 
of Christine Craft drew much press 
and TV coverage (lead stories on 
each of the three evening network 
shows, discussions on talk shows 
among network newswomen, op-ed 
columns in major newspapers). And 
perhaps Craft does symbolize a vic-
tory for female equality. 
Yet the coverage given the Craft 
story illustrates the very point she 
was rebelling against: the extent to 
which the mass media will focus on 
a story involving elites, involving a 
"sexy" (the pun is intended) issue, 
involving a symbolic drama about 
glamourous people (like Christine 
Craft)-celebrities living in the 
world of publicity, media values, 
and, yes, cosmetics. When celebrities 
enact a symbolic drama, we are 
given the illusion that the issue is 
now resolved, that now sexist or im-
ply unfair treatment of women at 
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The handsome people you see on TV news occupy a 
very different world from the wretched of the earth. 
work will end. The ca e of Chri tine 
Craft fa cinate the new media, but 
what do it have to do with the lives 
of ordinary women? 
It i likely that mo t women who 
work, on or off camera, in the major 
media organizations in this country 
are in favor of female equality and 
fair treatment. But from my point 
of view, the Craft case obscures the 
real issues concerning American 
women, diverting our attention 
from the problems that beset ordin-
ary folks. Most women- like most 
men- are indeed ordinary, and are 
beset with the mundane concerns of 
the uncelebrated world-scratch1.ng 
out a living, raising the kids, getting 
adequate day care, working at two 
jobs, putting up with spouses and 
ex-spouses. The great inequality of 
local, and in some measure, network 
TV news is not gender, it is class: 
there simply is very little coverage 
of the people on the bottom. The 
"class gap" means, for one thing, 
·that the problems of minority and 
poor women get little coverage. Are 
largely middle-class audiences, and 
the people who create the news, just 
not interested in the problems of, 
say, Chicano women working in 
sweat shops for starvation wages in 
El Paso? Probably. 
The cheerful and handsome peo-
ple you see on TV news occupy a 
very different world from the 
wretched of the earth. And they 
likely share the conclusion that 
media consultants regularly pass on 
to local stations: people don't want 
too much bad news, and the plight of 
women coping with hunger, dis-
possession, beatings, and unemploy-
ment is bad news. So their fellow 
women are erased, omitted from the 
mediated reality over which they 
preside nightly. Media celebrities 
such as newswomen are interested 
in portraying the problems of wom-
en they can understand, o the Craft 
case becomes a natural. The prob-
lem of an unnamed Chicano wom-
an in El Pao do not. We are unequal 
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in many ways, including celebrity. 
It is likely that women will largely 
gain respectful and fairly equal 
treatment in the media business in 
the years to come, if for no other 
reason than that they will focus much 
media attention on the problem. But 
the real question will be, how much 
attention will the women in the 
media focus on other women in the 
media, and how much will they fo-
cus on the vast number of women not 
in the media? Which women are 
news? In the struggle for female 
equality and dignity, who is im-
portant? The danger is that classes 
of women will be forgotten by the 
media contemplating itself as the 
center of the universe. Women in 
the media are caught up in the star 
system, and are in danger of for-
getting those "journalistic skills" of 
which Craft spoke in favor of a sym-
bolic drama of which the media peo-
ple themselves are the stars, not 
those unnamed millions of women 
whose problems and concerns the 
media has the responsibility to de-
pict. When ordinary women watch 
the news, what do they see of them-
selves? 
Perhaps they do not want to see 
themselves, preferring glamourous 
women and stories . But if "journalis-
tic" values are important, then does 
TV news have the responsibility to 
look at the question of how women, 
and not just media women, should 
be treated? Or are we moving more 
and more into the "Ken and Barbie" 
school of news reporting, with the 
temptation of media narcis ism more 
and more yielded to? We shall 
But there are already augurie : aft r 
winning her ca e, Chri tine raft 
announced to the world that h 
would now be involved in th pro-
duction of a made-for-T m i 
about her life, with a w 11-kn wn 
movie tar already ca t t play h r . 
o far a I know th r i n pr du -
tion und r \ ay in lving a w man 




How Hard-Won Victories 
Get Taken for Granted 
Alan Graebner 
Like my father, my grandfather, 
and my great-grandfather before 
me, I teach at a midwestern in titu-
tion of higher education. Unlike 
them, however, I teach at a Roman 
Catholic college for women. What 
my great-grandfather, who wa con-
vinced Leo XIII was a threat to 
American liberty, and what my 
grandfather, who in hi youth al o 
taught Minne ota (alb it orw ian 
Lutheran) women, would ay ab ut 
my situation i omething for which 
I await et rnity with fitting pati n e. 
In the meantim I p nd mu h of 
my profe i nal !if trying t und r-
tand, and to h lp tud nt · appr -
ciate, th hi tory of worn n in thi 
country. ery pring t rm w b -
gin in th arly v nt nth ntury 
and by Ma hav m t th arly 
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College for women was unthinkable because people knew that the fairer sex does 
not reason, it intuits. Women, it was commonly assumed, do not think; they feel. 
19 0 . It i an intere ting four 
month this trip through four cen-
turies· neither the cenery nor the 
per pective are ever quite the same. 
Each year there i more {both chol-
arship and year ) to get into a term 
that stays the same length. My fellow 
travelers change as well. A decade 
ago I could conclude with a few ver-
bal nods at women's liberation, but 
to students born in the year Friedan 
wrote the Feminine Mystique, that 
and the ew Left have now to be as 
carefully explained as the legal sys-
tem of the colonies. 
The female college 
students of today 
contradict the best 
informed expectations of 
the nineteenth century. 
So I found myself during the con-
cluding week of last spring's term, 
puzzling over how I should try to 
pull things together for the final 
lecture. Appalled at the number of 
topics still left untouched, I turned 
to the time-honored strategy of try-
ing to define what the students most 
needed to know. To do that, of 
course, one must define carefully 
who the students are. 
As I pondered that matter, I sud-
denly realized they are all wrong, 
these students. They are pleasant 
women, mostly from middle-class 
homes in the Upper Midwest. They 
come to class un-selfconsciously 
dressed in jeans and shirts. They 
are at least mildly interested, polite 
and respectful- often too much so. 
With varying degrees of efficiency 
they take notes during lectures, and 
do the readings. We have some dis-
cussions that barely get off the 
ground, and others that arouse in-
tense participation; but in both 
cases rationality is the rule. The 
students take the exams and most of 
them pass, some brilliantly. Their 
grades get posted to their transcripts, 
along with grades from all manner 
of courses in the sciences as well as 
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the art c rtification " h r with to 
apply for job and graduate hool. 
In late May the tudent with uffi-
cient eniority graduate and go on 
the mailing li t of the college alum-
nae office. In due cour e, mo t of the 
alumnae write back with news of 
jobs, marriages, and children. 
one of this is unique these day . 
But by the standards of an earlier 
day, all of it is wrong. These women 
I teach ought not exist. In practically 
every particular I have mentioned, 
my students contradict the best in-
formed expectations of the nine-
teenth century and before. Until 
relatively recently, the most re-
spected opinion of the day knew that 
the idea of a college-educated wom-
an was ludicrous, and the idea of a 
college woman with career more 
preposterous still. College for wom-
en was unthinkable because peo-
ple knew that the fairer sex does not 
reason, it intuits. Women do not 
think; they feel. Women who volun-
tarily leave the home unsex them-
selves. They might just as well wear 
trousers to prove they are certainly 
no longer women. Their hands, feet, 
and facial features lose feminine 
delicacy. Girls who try to study in 
college doom themselves to sterility, 
if not permanent invalidism and 
Readin uch opinion , my 
dent - tho who by th p ta-
tion ought not i t-are u ually 
more puzzled than outraged· we 
are after all no longer in the even-
tie . The beliefs are o outlandish 
that student often try to make ense 
of them in ways that I have learned 
to warn again t. One way to explain 
the ideas i to assume these views 
arose from the lunatic fringe; there 
have always been crazies who said 
bizarre things. But in fact the people 
who voiced this advice were sober 
folk who pondered the state of so-
ciety in a concerned and conscien-
tious way. They were the sort of 
public-spirited citizens who one day 
would read In Luce Tua. 
Another way I see some students 
treating these opinions is to view 
them as comic and thus benign. Af-
ter all, our great-grandmothers lived 
apparently satisfied and productive 
lives without access to college. For-
tunately historians are allowed a 
sense of humor; they may laugh as 
well as weep over the misplaced cer-
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Education was not simply novel, but an ominous threat 
to the family, the state, and the natural order. 
tainti of the pa t. And yet to treat 
tho a rtion of the past a benign 
i to a um that unle the victim 
ream there i no victim. Is not the 
employ e who e pension fund is 
ecretl y embezzled robbed whether 
or not he realizes it? 
still more common temptation 
i to as ume these people in the past 
did not really mean what they were 
saying. They were somehow only 
actors in a period-piece drama re-
peating lines given to them. Secretly 
they knew better. The naivete of 
this interpretation would be charm-
ing if it were not so arrogant. Of 
course those people in the nine-
teenth century meant what they 
were saying. For them the college 
women we take for granted were 
inconceivable, not in the sense of 
being unimaginable, but in the 
sense of being a tragic mistake. To 
fail to comprehend that inconceiv-
ability is to distort the past, to make 
the past into the present, comfort-
able in its familiarity. And to do 
that is to miss important lessons. 
A common temptation 
is to assume that 
people in the past did 
not really mean 
what they were saying. 
One of those lessons is the cour-
ageousness of the handful in the 
nineteenth century who insisted 
women could be, and ought to be, 
educated in college just as men 
were. They insisted on -the goal 
when they had no models and no 
proof. They could not point reassur-
ingly to the reality of my students 
in the 1980s. All they had was the 
principle of justice and the courage 
of their convictions. It is not just 
that they were operating on faith. 
That is often said of pioneers-and 
it misses an important dimension 
of their actions. These pioneers were 
pursuing a course that was not only 
untried, but one that the most judi-
cious counsel of their time advised 
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was a terrible blunder, something 
that would ruin individual lives 
and society itself. College education 
was not simply novel, but an om-
inous threat to the family, the state, 
and the natural order. 
Why stress all this? One reason is 
to appreciate more fully the her-
oines we have. Another is because 
we, too, live in a time when pro-
posals are being urged to change 
the place of women. But what is 
being advocated strikes many cau-
tious observers as fraught with peril, 
dangerous threats to the family, the 
state, and the natural order. Our 
society has heard such cautions be-
fore. And on education they were 
wrong, dead wrong. One might say 
laughably wrong, except for the 
damage they did to the lives of so 
many people. 
Do earlier misperceptions make 
all current proposals for change 
right? Of course not. But when we 
find we have assumptions and are 
engaged in behavior that our fore-
bears damned unequivocally, pas-
sionately, and fearfully, is that not 
a lesson as we in turn look to the 
future? And does this not suggest 
that when we hear proposals con-
scientiously based on principles of 
justice, we ought to respond with 
hope and energy, not fear and foot-
dragging? 
On occasion, in discussions of 
feminism-discussions which tacitly 
assume college education for wom-
en - I try to explain that what is at 
issue is not simply equal pay or 
access to careers, but radical redefi-
nitions of what a career is and re-
formulations of family role . If I am 
sufficiently eloquent or the Ii t ner 
sufficiently prescient, there i often 
a long, frowning silence. Then , "but 
surely," come the concerned and 
puzzled reply, "feminist ant b 
seriou . That' ju t imp ibl . It 
would change our whol i ty. '' 
t that it is my turn for ii n . H w 
can I explain about m tud nt wh 
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When the Theatre 
Rocked the Cradle 
A Thirties Revival 
Recalls a Radical Era 
John Steven Paul 
I 
John Houseman designed the 
Acting Company's recent revival of 
Marc Blitzstein's The Cradle WiJl 
Rock to hearken back to the original 
production and its circumstanc s. 
Houseman produced the original 
for the Works Progress Adminis-
tration 's Federal Theatre Project in 
1937 with Orson Welles directing. 
This spirited revival of th play with 
music opened la t spring at New 
York's City Center and it national 
tour includ d a umm r stop at 
Ravinia Park, the picnic pot f r 
Chicago' cultural tabJi hment. 
The Cradle ha b en alled an 
American Threepenny Opera and j f 
the Blitz tein work cliff r from th 
John t n aul teach s in th De-
partment of peech and Drama aL al-
paraiso niver. it and seroes as regu lar 
T heatre cn'tic fo r h t. 
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In Blitzstein's inquiry, Religion, the Press, Education, Medicine-all the 
bastions of bourgeois civilization-reveal themselves as habitual prostitutes. 
ter Mister. Mister Mister also owns 
and runs the lives of the folks who 
live in Steeltown, like Moll, a girl 
whose blues ballad, "The ickel 
Under The Foot," opens the score. 
The economic facts of life in Steel-
town permit her to work only two 
days a week. In order to eat on the 
other five days, Moll turns desper-
ately to prostitution. 
Meanwhile, a young union or-
ganizer, Larry Foreman, is trying 
to wrest the town from Mister Mister 
and to give it to the people who live 
and make a living there. On one 
particular night Foreman and Moll 
meet up in night court, he for union 
agitating and she for ·soliciting. In 
the courtroom, Blitzstein broadens 
the conflict by inquiring into the 
moral conduct of a number of Steel-
town society's pillars. Mister Mister, 
it soon becomes clear, does not boss 
the town without help, and Moll is 
not the only prostitute on the street. 
First among those prostituting 
themselves for Mister Mister is the 
Reverend Salvation. The smarmy 
Salvation's sermons have long been 
cued to the fluctuations of the inter-
national steel market. When in 1916 
good business dictated selling arma-
ments to all warring parties in Eu-
rope, Salvation preached neutrality 
thinly disguised as pacifism. When 
joining the war on the side of Britain 
and France looked profitable, the 
minister's homilies extolled peace 
that passes all understanding and 
death to the Hun in a war to end all 
wars. As long as the Reverend re-
ceives his weekly "collection" from 
the Misters, the content of his mes-
sage is entirely malleable. 
The Misters have persuaded Rev-
erend Salvation and others of Steel-
town's solid citizens to join their 
"Liberty Committee" to protect the 
town against "union tyranny." Other 
members include Editor Daily 
whose enforced loyalty to Mister 
Mister is a mockery of the freedom 
of the press. In order to retain his 
publishing privilege, the editor runs 
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a slander series against Mi ter Mis-
ter's enemy, Larry Foreman. When 
Mister Mister needs to round up 
anti-union goons he suggests that 
President Prexy of College U niver-
sity require two years of military 
training of all male students. To 
keep his powerful trustee happy, the 
president readily agrees to his de-
mands and then finds him a suitable 
faculty propagandist for the recruit-
ment rahy. Mister Mister names 
Dr. Specialist chairman of the Lib-
erty Committee-an appointment 
that wins the physician a prestigious 
research position - in return for his 
certification that one of Mister Mis-
ter's employees, Joe Worker, was 
drunk and fell into a ladle of molten 
steel. The truth, of course, is that the 
employee, who had been campaign-
ing for the union, was pushed. 
In Blitzstein's ip.quiry, Religion, 
the Press, Education, Medicine-
all the bastions of bourgeois civil-
ization- reveal themselves as habit-
ual prostitutes. Nor does Art have 
any claim to integrity. Yasha and 
Dauber, musician and artist respec-
tively, play up to Mrs. Mister's van-
ity, and she patronizes them in re-
turn. Again this year the artists' 
grim prospects will force them to 
Mrs. Mister's banal but bountiful 
weekend salons. When she asks them 
to join her husband's Liberty Com-
mittee they accept without question. 
After all, they sing, we're not poli-
ticians, but artists. 
And we love art for art's sake 
It's smart for art's sake 
to part for art's sake 
With your heart for art's sake 
And your mind for art's sake 
Be blind for art's sake 
And deaf for art's sake 
And dumb for art's sake 
Until for art's sake 
They kill for art's sake 
All the art for art's sake. 
But The Cradle Will Rock indicts 
the establishment types on more 
counts than just prostitution; their 
crimes are not victimless. Their col-
lusion with the boss results in in-
ju tic and e ploitati n, in un m-
ploym nt, hunger ill-hou ing. The 
Mister and their Lib rty Commit-
tee ha e deprived the Joe Worker 
of just that their lib rty, and of 
other con titutionally-guaranteed 
rights such a the pur uit of happi-
ness, and sometimes of life itself. A 
closed union shop, according to 
Larry Foreman, will restore those 
rights to everyone in Steeltown, pro-
tect democratic institutions, and 
rock the cradle of the Liberty Com-
mittee. Blitzstein portrays the choice 
between Mister Mister and the 
union, between management and 
labor, as a choice between fascism 
and democracy. The sound of 
marching that closes the show testi-
fies to the people's choice, the begin-
ning of Mister Mister's demise. 
Even in 1937, in the midst of a 
decade that rang with radicalism 
(and perhaps because of this), The 
Cradle Will Rock sounded danger-
ously radical. The allegorical, al-
most cartoonish, nature of the show 
does not blunt the edge of its mes-
sage. Its satire is abrasive; its humor 
pointedly ironic. Indeed it is now 
no wonder that its producer, the 
Federal Government, closed the 
show before opening night. 
II 
The rich and remarkable history 
of The Federal Theatre, 1935-1939, has 
been carefully rehearsed by histor-
ian Jane DeHart Matthews ( Prince-
ton University Press, 1967). The 
Federal Theatre Project was one of 
four arts components ( the others 
being the Art, Music, and Writers 
projects) of the Works Progress Ad-
ministration, the Roosevelt Admin-
istration's massive effort to put the 
unemployed back to work. Accord-
ing to Professor Matthews, W.P.A. 
administrator Harry Hopkins nur-
tured a special concern for artists 
victimized by the Great Depression. 
Hopkins' choice for a director of the 
theatre project was Vassar drama 
The Cresset 
Political enemies of Franklin Roosevelt and his New Deal programs found the 
Federal Theatre to be an easy mark in their efforts to discredit the President. 
prof or Halli Flanagan Davis, a 
tud nt in th famed George Pierce 
Baker ' 47 Workshop" in drama at 
Harvard, pecialist in modern Eu-
ropean theatre, and Hopkins' for-
mer cla mate at Grinnell College. 
Together, these two idealists hoped 
to forge a 'free, adult, and uncen-
ored' theatre from a large, diverse, 
and geographically-dispersed popu-
lation of unemployed theatre pro-
fessionals, and to use this theatre as 
a means of relief, not only for unem-
ployed actors and craftspeople, but 
also for the millions of people whom 
the Depression had deprived of en-
tertaining and educational diver-
sions. 
The story of the Federal Theatre 
is that of a dozen or so notable suc-
cesses, some spectacular, others 
heart-warming, in spite of various 
obstacles that would lead to the 
project's termination. It was Flana-
gan's idea to create a decentralized 
national theatre, subsidized by the 
government, modeled to some ex-
tent on the state theatres of Europe. 
With this goal in mind she set out to 
win an audience around the U.S. 
with performances of every kind, 
including straight drama, musical 
revues and vaudeville, children's 
plays, marionettes, and opera. Flan-
agan also encouraged experimenta-
tion, and the FTP became famous for 
developing an entirely new form of 
drama called "the living newspaper," 
which today's television viewer 
might dub "docu-drama." Federal 
Theatre productions played to well 
over thirty million people, many of 
whom had never seen live theatre. 
Despite Flanagan's attempt to de-
centralize the Federal Theatre, the 
project fared best in the large urban 
centers, especially Los Angeles, Chi-
cago, and New York. One of Chi-
cago's memorable contributions was 
The Swing Mikado, an original adap-
tation of the Gilbert and ullivan 
operetta performed by an all- egro 
cast. Indeed, one of the mo t im-
portant contribution of the FTP a 
October, 1983 
a whole was the opportunity it pro-
vided Black actors and actresses for 
whom discrimination was as much a 
problem in the theatre as it was in 
society at large. 
In New York the Negro Theatre 
Project was among the first of the 
Federal Theatre's groups to begin 
work. Its director, John Houseman, 
moved into Harlem's old LaFayette 
Theatre, hired nearly eight hundred 
people from the relief roles, and 
chose Macbeth as the company's first 
production. In order to insure an 
energetic, excellent, and innovative 
debut, Houseman secured Orson 
Welles, an en/ant terri"ble barely out 
of his teens. Welles set the tragedy 
in nineteenth-century Haiti with 
Shakespeare's witches replaced by 
Voodoo priestesses. The brilliant 
"Voodoo Macbeth" was a critical and 
popular success. It played for ten 
sold-out weeks in Harlem and two 
months more on Broadway before 
going on a triumphal national tour, 
all under the auspices of the Federal 
Theatre. 
The Federal Theatre Project 
could point to successes other than 
those of its Negro projects. Among 
its undisputed achievements were 
productions of Murder in the Cathe-
drat and Dr. Faustus, both presented 
by the Houseman-Welles team; One-
Third of a Nation, a living newspaper 
about wretched living conditions 
during the Depression; Prologue to 
Glory, a Lincoln play; Sinclair 
Lewis's It Can 't Happen Here, a warn-
ing about indigenous fascism; and 
Shaw's Androcles and the Lion. Un-
fortunately for the FTP and its di-
rector, high-quality productions 
were all but incompatible with the 
concept of a relief project. The ar-
chitects of the W.P.A., and even more 
so the Congress which funded it, 
conceived its role as one of employ-
ing and paying people for the short-
est time possible before returning 
them to a recovering private sector. 
Hallie Flanagan's dreams of a na-
tional theatre notwithstanding, con-
tinuity of personnel and programs 
was the rarest commodity in th 
Federal Theatre. 
Political enemies of Franklin 
Roosevelt and hi ew D al pro-
grams found the F d r al Th atr 
to be an ea y mark in their effort 
to discredit the President. Wh n it 
productions were exc 11 nt and w 11 -
received , th FTP wa a u · d f 
competing with privat th atri a l 
enterpri e. Wor , th Pr j t was 
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The 1983 revival of The Cradle Will Rock opens with a reading that explicitly 
recalls the events that led up to the 1937 premier of the 'labor musical." 
attacked, e pecially by Republican 
members of Congress, for harborincr 
political leftists, working-cla agi-
tators, and communist sympathizers 
and for producing plays that were 
salacious, unpatriotic, or simply 
worthless. Finally, as Malcolm Cow-
ley wrote, the lower-middle classes 
distrusted anything connected with 
the theatre, "a sentiment that sur-
vives from the seventeenth century, 
when the stage, to good Puritans, 
was not only the devil's workshop 
but also the chief amusement of their 
enemies the aristocrats. Thus the 
theatre project was damned for its 
royalist antecedents as well as for its 
working-class sympathies." Under 
duress of such attacks, W.P.A. offi-
cials became censors of their own 
project. 
III 
Houseman had left the Negro 
Theatre Project to assume the lead-
ership of the Federal Theatre's 
Classical Unit, or "Project 891," as it 
came to be called. It was in this con-
text, perhaps, that his collaboration 
with Orson Welles reached its high-
est artistic achievement. After they 
had established themselves with 
productions of Horse Eats Hat and 
The Tragical History of Dr. Faustus at 
the Maxine Elliott theatre, Marc 
Blitzstein brought his play with 
music to the pair. Welles was par-
ticularly keen about working in 
musical theatre and after the com-
poser had played and sung the piece 
for an enthusiastic Hallie Flanagan, 
The Cradle Will Rock was announced 
as the next production of W.P.A. 
Project 891. 
In his inspiring memoir, Run-
Through, John Houseman describes 
the events that led up to The Cradle 
Will Rock's premier. As with all 
Houseman-Well es productions, the 
preparations were elaborate and, at 
times, frantic. Will Geer and How-
ard DaSilva as Mister Mister and 
Larry Foreman led the cast through 
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the how' complicated erie of 
ballad , aria , en emble and choru 
number a well a th corre pond-
ing dance routin . The many cene 
change of the work were to be man-
aged by a sy tern of gla s-bottomed 
scenic wagons, which would appar-
ently have given the production a 
cinematic flow. 
Some weeks before the opening, a 
W.P.A. official watched a run-
through of the show and pro-
nounced it' magnificent." Ten days 
before opening 18,000 tickets had 
been sold and on June 14 the re-
hearsal period culminated in a pre-
view performance before a full house 
at the Maxine Elliott. But on June 
12, Houseman and his staff received 
a memo from the W.P.A. in Wash-
ington prohibiting "because of im-
pending cuts ,and reorganization, 
any new play, musical performance, 
or art gallery to open before July l." 
Houseman and Welles suspected 
that the W.P.A. had postponed the 
show because its content was "dan-
gerous" and would eventually cen-
sor the production. Protests were 
lodged; special pleas were pled to 
no avail. The opening performance 
at the Elliott would not take place. 
The 1983 revival of The Cradle 
Will Rock opens with a reading from 
Run-Through retelling the events 
that led up to the 1937 premier of the 
"labor musical." (In New York, 
Houseman himself appeared on 
stage to perform the reading.) The 
section is too long to quote here, 
but I recommend it to you as a mem-
oir of a time when a theatre piece in 
this country was considered serious 
enough to be banned by the govern-
ment. In short, Houseman, Welles, 
and Bli tzstein and their actors and 
production team set about to find 
another theatre to produce the show 
under their own auspices. They 
found a theatre, but in the mean-
time the Actors' Equity Association 
had prohibited member actors on 
the Federal Theatre Project from 
performing The Cradle on stage un-
d r an th r mana m nt. R -
fu ·ing t n d d f at, H u man 
u t d that Equit had n t pr -
hibited th a tor fr m p rf rmin 
onl from p rf rming on stage. Wh n 
th huge audi n , which had 
walked tw nty blo k uptown to the 
enice theatr , ttl d in it eat , 
Marc Blitz tein came out on tage 
alone, sat at an upright piano, and 
began to play and ing Moll's open-
ing lines, fully intending to sing all 
the parts him elf if necessary. 
"It was a few seconds," Housem.an 
writes, 
before we realized that to Marc's strained 
tenor another voice - a faint. wavering so-
prano-had been added . It was not clear at 
first where it came from .. . . Then , hearing 
the words taken out of his mouth . Marc 
paused, and at that moment the spotlight 
moved off the stage, past the proscenium 
arch into the house, and came to rest on 
the lower left box where a thin girl in a 
green dress with dyed red hair was stand-
ing, glassy-eyed . stiff with fear , only half 
audible at first in the huge theatre but 
gathering strength with every note. 
The performance continued, "a 
breeze" after that first courageous 
act, with Marc Blitzstein playing 
and calling out essential stage direc-
tions and the singers and actors per-
forming from the house. Houseman 
and Welles, severing their associa-
tion with the FTP, went on to pro-
duce The Cradle Will Rock at the 
famed Mercury theatre. 
The 1983 revival of The Cradle is 
played from a bare stage. A piano 
player is surrounded by twenty cafe 
chairs where the actors sit waiting 
to come to the front to perform the 
numbers without the aid of sets or 
elaborate props. The company is 
excellent-Moll is played by Patti 
LuPone, the original Broadway 
"Evita" - and there are moments 
when the viewer is surrounded by 
the excitement that, in John House-
man's words, "is generated on those 
rare and blessed occasions when the 
theatre is suddenly swept into the 
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A Name Is a Name 
Is an Identity 
Dot Nuechterlein 
My parents named me Dorothea 
Ida after two people- my older 
brother Theodore and my paternal 
grandmother. I liked them both, 
but I've never liked either name. I 
suspect that's because even as a child 
I felt somehow the names were 
theirs: Dorothea Ida wasn't really 
me. 
Fortunately my parents also gave 
me a nickname, and until high 
school I never met another Dot. 
Movie magazines used it for Dorothy 
Lamour (you do remember Dorothy 
Lamour?), and occasionally a story-
book or cartoon character with that 
name popped up, but in my world, 
Dot was exclusively mine. To this 
day it remains the only name in my 
head for myself. 
My legal name is actually Doro-
thea Jane. Someone in the small ma-
ternity hospital where I was born 
apparently blundered when regis-
tering me in the Ohio vital-statistics. 
My parents didn't bother with a cor-
rection (after all, the church records 
were right), and I haven't either, 
since this second identity always 
seemed a bit exotic. 
At age ten I took a fancy to Jane 
and attached it to poetry, secret stor-
ies, and the school paper I tried to 
establish. Alas, one-room country 
schools have too few pupils to pro-
vide either news or audience: that 
venture failed, as did my attempts to 
get others to call me Jane-their 
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The question vexes: if names are simply symbols 
of ourselves, then just who do we think we are? 
habits were stronger than my wishes. 
Today the only reminder, apart 
from a faded blue birth certificate, 
is the middle name of my oldest 
child. 
No matter. I discovered that as a 
name, Dot has a lot going for it. It 
cannot be mispronounced, which is 
a blessing to one whose maiden and 
married surnames are regular! y 
mangled. Likewise, it cannot be 
misspelled. Oh, my immigrant 
grandfather, who got by in a dozen 
languages, addressed the only letter 
he ever sent me to "Dadie," but 
that's exceptional. The only prob-
lem I have with this name is that 
some people just won't use it. 
A few simply do not like the in-
formality of nicknames. Yet I figure 
if a fellow could take the oath of of-
fice as President of these United 
States using Jimmy, I in my humble 
station should have the freedom to 
go by Dot. Besides, one of my friends 
(YOU KNOW WHO YOU ARE!) 
who criticizes my signing Dot to 
these columns never seems to use 
her own given name. 
But some of those who won't use 
Dot don't get Dorothea straight, 
either, and Dorothy, Dorthea, and 
other variations irritate because they 
are inaccurate. A handful of friends 
use my childhood name Dottie, 
which is fine, except it always sounds 
a trifle funny to my ears, and seeing 
it in print puts me psychologically 
back in the second grade. 
So over the yea.rs I have contin-
ually confronted the name business, 
and I wrestled with naming-as-part-
of-identity long before learning that 
philosophers, social thinkers, and 
theologians (Cf. baptism) discuss the 
phenomenon. 
Helen Keller suppo edly said that 
she became truly human only aft r 
she realized that everything- every 
person, object, idea-had a nam , 
herself included. It i by namin 
them that we di tingui h on entit 
from another. 
Which brings u to th probl m f 
addressing a married woman by her 
husband's name. And this i's a prob-
lem today: social rules have changed, 
and we confront such a variety of 
practices we hardly know what to 
call anyone. 
Once upon a time it was necessary 
to know whether or not a woman was 
married, since neither unmarried 
nor widowed singles could survive 
independently. Forms of address 
told the world who was what: Mrs. 
John Smith had a husband to sup-
port her; Mrs. Jane Smith's husband 
had died ( or deserted her); Miss 
June Smith had never had one. To-
day these distinctions are unneces-
sary, so they go largely unobserved. 
When I took the vows two decades 
ago it was unusual for a woman to 
keep her name; the switch was diffi-
cult for me, and while gradually 
adjusting to the new last name I did 
everything possible to remain Dot. 
Mr. & Mrs. Himself is great for 
"couple" things, but not when the 
reference is to only one. Through 
the years I thought I f lt this way 
because of my peculiar nam -con-
sciousness, but now I find that I hav 
been part of a larger o ial chang . 
The majority of today ' Am rican 
women are in the labor f r , a u '-
tomed to seeing their own nam ' on 
paychecks, tax tat m nt , and d k 
plaques. It i not urpri ing that th y 
seem le likely to pi tur th m -
selve a Mr . Hu band than wa 
common wh n few w rk d ut id 
their own hou hold . 
The chan 
ited to th 
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